On August 15, 1996, the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration (Lucienne Robillard) gave notice to
Vladimir Katriuk, a Canadian Citizen, that it was her intention to
request that the Governor in Council revoke his citizenship.
"... on the grounds that you have been admitted to Canada for
permanent residence and have obtained Canadian citizenship by false
representations or fraud ..."
 On August 27, 1996, Mr. Katriuk, pursuant to paragraph 18.1(a) of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 29, as amended, wrote to the Minister [Lucienne Robillard]
requesting that she refer the matter of the revocation of his
citizenship to the Federal Court of Canada. On October 31, 1996,
the Attorney General [Alan Rock] of Canada, on behalf of the Lucienne Robillard, referred the matter to this [Federal] Court [of Canada]. By his proceedings, the Attorney General [Alan Rock]
seeks a declaration from this Court that Mr. Katriuk obtained his
Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly
concealing material circumstances.
 Mr. Katriuk is of Ukrainian ancestry.
He was born on October 1, 1921 in the Village of Luzhany, near the City
of Chernivtsi...situated in an area known as Bukovina which was then
part of Romania.
 After completing Grade 6,
Mr.Katriuk commenced an apprenticeship in the meat packing trade in
Chernivtsi for a period of three years (1935 to 1938). For the next two
and one half years, he worked in a meat factory returning to his
village shortly before the arrival of troops from the Soviet Union in
1940. The Soviet troops arrived to occupy Bukovina following the pact
entered into between Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1939. The
Soviet occupation lasted until Germany invaded the newly created
regions of the Soviet Union in June of 1941. Shortly thereafter, German
troops arrived in Bukovina with their Hungarian and Romanian allies.
 Neither the Soviet nor the German
occupation was pleasant for the local Ukranian inhabitants. Professor
Orest Subtelny in Ukraine A History, 2nd ed.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), at 453, offers a vivid
description of the plight of the Ukrainians during that period:
 In the fall of 1941, Mr. Katriuk,
like many of his Ukrainian compatriots from Bukovina, joined a
volunteer force which marched to Kyiv to, amongst other things,
liberate that city, and hence liberate Ukraine. The march to Kyiv took
a number of months. The Bukovinians arrived in Kyiv in November or
December of 1941. In due course, the Germans who were occupying Kyiv,
after a brief period of coexistence with Ukrainian nationalists,
decided that Ukrainian nationalism would not be tolerated in the
occupied territories. As a result, many of the leaders of the Ukrainian
National Movement were either arrested or executed.
 The Germans then proceeded to form
battalions in which different nationals, including Ukrainians, would
serve Germany. The first battalion to be formed was Battalion 115, of
which Mr. Katriuk became a member. All members of Battalion 115 were
Ukrainians. Subsequently, before the end of 1942, the Germans formed
Battalion 118. Approximately 100 men from Battalion 115,
including Mr. Katriuk, were taken to form Battalion 118. The third
company of Battalion 115 became the first company of Battalion 118.
Prisoners of war captured by the Germans from the retreating Soviet
armies were also recruited into this battalion. They became the second
and third companies of Battalion 118. The Battalion was formed of about
500 men divided between three companies each of which was divided into
three platoons. In turn, each platoon was composed of a number of units
of ten to thirteen men. Mr. Katriuk was a member of the first platoon
of the first company of Battalion 118 and was made a sergeant in charge
of a unit. Battalion 118 was led by Ukrainian officers under the
overall command of German officers.
 At the end of 1942, the men of
Battalion 118 were taken in trucks to the City of Minsk in Belarus.
From Minsk, the battalion was sent to Pleshchenitsi. Following its stay
in Pleshchenitsi, the battalion went to Evye, a Polish village, where
the battalion remained for approximately one year, i.e. from the spring
of 1943 to the time of the Russian advance in the spring of 1944.
 With respect to the battalion"s
activities while in Kyiv, Minsk, Pleshchenitsi and Evye, Mr. Katriuk,
in his statement filed in response to the Minister"s summary of facts
and evidence, gave the following explanation:
 As the Russian army advanced in
the Spring of 1944, the German troops, including Battalions 115 and
118, began their retreat towards the West. At some point during the
retreat, i.e. somewhere in what was then East Prussia,
Battalions 115 and 118 were merged into one battalion. According
to Mr. Katriuk, the newly created battalion [#62] would have had approximately 500 to 600 men.
 In August of 1944, the men of the
new battalion were transported by train to Bésançon, France. From
there, they were taken to Valderharn, a small village where German
anti-aircraft forces were stationed in large barracks built during
Napoleon"s rule. The members of the new battalion were informed by
their German officers that they would now be part of the Waffen S.S. 30th
 Following their arrival at
Valderharn, some members of the new battalion made contact with the
French underground and, in particular, with what was then known as the
Forces Françaises de l"Intérieur ("FFI"). One day, Mr. Katriuk and his
companions were informed by German officers that they would be fighting
the allies on the following day. According to Mr. Katriuk, he and his
companions were waiting for an opportunity to join the French
underground and, consequently, that evening, a majority of the men of
the battalion defected to the French partisans.
 As part of the FFI, Mr. Katriuk
and his colleagues fought on a number of occasions against German
troops. They were, in due course, sent to the front to fight against
Germany. While they were fighting at the front, Soviet officers came to
visit them with a request that they return to the "motherland". Mr.
Katriuk did not want to return to Russia as he feared he would be sent
to Siberia for a long period of time. As a result of Soviet pressure,
Mr. Katriuk and his colleagues were removed from the front and sent to
the village of Dumblair where they remained for a few days. Their
weapons were taken from them and the French informed them they would
have to return to Russia. After discussing the matter with French
officers, they were informed that the only way they could avoid being
sent back to Russia was to join the French Foreign Legion ("FFL"). Mr.
Katriuk joined the FFL as did many of his colleagues.
 Mr. Katriuk was taken by train to
Marseille in order to enroll in the FFL. According to Mr. Katriuk, 100
to 120 men of the merged battalions decided to return to the Soviet
 Mr. Katriuk officially joined the
FFL in September 1944 as a private. He was one of twenty to twenty-five
"volunteers" who were asked by their French commanders to go to the
front to fight the German army. At the front, Mr. Katriuk was placed in
charge of a machine gun and, during the course of his participation,
was severely injured. He spent two and one half months in an American
hospital in France.
 In 1945, Mr. Katriuk again fought
with the allies, this time at the Italian front near Monaco. It was
during this period of time that the Second World War came to an end.
Mr. Katriuk was taken from Italy to Nice, France where he rested and
was then taken to barracks near Paris (at Meaux) where FFL troops were
to be reorganized so as to be sent to Indochina.
 At Meaux, Mr. Katriuk fell under
the command of a Spanish sergeant. His relationship with his commanding
officer was very poor and, as a result, his commanding officer informed
him that it was doubtful that he would return alive from Indochina were
he would shortly be sent.
 Mr. Katriuk took his new identity
papers to the municipality of Paris and was issued a "carte d"invité"
valid for three months. In due course, his "carte d"invité" was renewed
for a period of ten years. He then started looking for a job and found
one as a butcher for a small company where he worked for approximately
ten months. Mr. Katriuk then found a better paying job, again as a
butcher, and remained at this new job for approximately two years
following which he and two partners started a business.
 One of his partners was a
Frenchman that he had met at his second job and together they found a
third partner, an Ukrainian from Bukovina, Ivan Serbyn. Their business
was a wholesale delicatessen operation, selling headcheese, hams,
sausages, etc.. At one point in time, the business had eighteen
employees. Because of French laws, neither Mr. Serbyn, nor Mr.
Katriuk, as foreigners, could own the business and therefore their
wives were the legal owners.
 Mr. Katriuk met his future wife at
the end of 1945 or in the early months of 1946. Maria Stéphanie Kawun,
a French citizen, lived in Paris in the 6e Arrondissement. She was
born in Troyes, France on February 3, 1927. Her parents were Ukrainians
who had immigrated to France in 1924. Mr. Katriuk and his wife were
married in Paris on February 10, 1948. Maria Stéphanie Kawun became
Maria Stéphanie Schpirka.
 Although the Schpirkas had no
particular reason to come to Canada, they decided to take steps to come
to this country after receiving a letter of invitation from Mr. and
Mrs. Rohosky, Ukrainian friends whom they had met in Paris and who had
immigrated to Canada. The Rohoskys had come to France from Switzerland.
In their letter of invitation, the Rohoskys informed the Schpirkas that
there were a large number of Ukrainians living in Canada and that the
Province of Quebec was French speaking.
 Before the Schpirkas decided to
take steps to see whether they could immigrate to Canada, Ivan Serbyn
informed his partners that he was immigrating to Canada and, as a
result, sold them his interest in the business. Sometime in the spring
of 1951, Mr. and Mrs. Schpirka took the Rohosky letter to the Canadian
consulate to find out whether they could immigrate to Canada. Mr.
Katriuk does not remember much of the immigration process which led to
his obtaining a visa. He does not remember being asked anything
specific at the Canadian Consulate. He testified that he never filled
out nor signed any form. He remembers seeing a doctor who asked that he
have x-rays taken. He also remembers meeting an immigration officer
with whom he spoke in French. Mr. Katriuk stated categorically that he
was never interviewed and that he attended the Consulate on two or
three occasions. Mr. Katriuk denies having been asked what he did
between 1938 and 1945.
 Within a matter of months, the
Schpirkas obtained their Canadian visas. The Schpirkas boarded the ship
NELLY at the port of Le Havre on August 6, 1951 and arrived in
Quebec city on August 14, 1951. The following day, the Schpirkas
proceeded to Montreal by train where they arrived at Windsor Station.
The Schpirkas then took a taxi to the Rohosky residence situated in the
Montreal district of Rosemont. According to Mr. Katriuk, he did not see
nor was he interviewed by immigration officers upon arrival in Quebec
 Within a matter of weeks, Nicolas
Schpirka had found a job. Initially, he attempted to find a job with
Canada Packers but was refused because he could not speak English.
Shortly thereafter he found a job with Frontenac Packing where he was
paid $0.90 per hour. He worked 40 hours a week. He then found what he
considered a well-paying job at $56.00 a week. He subsequently worked
with Drash H. Kosher Meats and with Hygrade where he spent his days
inside a freezer. Mr. Schpirka started having problems with his
legs and his doctor advised him to leave his job at Hygrade if he
"wanted to walk on his feet".
 As a result, Mr. Schpirka decided
to help his wife, a hairdresser, who had recently opened a beauty
salon. Also, Mr. Schpirka began cultivating bees on a farm owned by one
of his friends. When his friend sold the farm, Mr. Schpirka bought his
 In Canada, Mr. Schpirka frequented
the Church of St Sophie, an Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Montreal. In
1957, Mr. Schpirka confided in his priest [Rev. Slusar] that his real name was Katriuk and that he wanted to revert to his true name. Rev. Slusar advised him to see a lawyer and suggested that he see Me Paul Massé, Q.C.. Rev. Slusar
took Schpirka to see Me Massé. After having related to Me Massé the
events which led him to change his name, Mr. Schpirka asked Me Massé
what could be done to enable him to change his name back to Katriuk.
Mr. Katriuk did not give Me Massé any information concerning his
activities prior to his arrival in France in 1944.
 Me Massé, after inquiring with the
Department of Citizenship and Immigration (the "Department"), informed
Nicolas Schpirka that the easiest way would be for him to apply to the
Department for a name change before filing his application for Canadian
 On May 20, 1958, Vladimir Katriuk
and his wife signed applications for citizenship under the name of
Katriuk which the Department received on May 26, 1958. In his
application, Mr. Katriuk stated that he was born in Luzhany, Romania
(Ukraine), that he was a Romanian citizen and that his ethnic origin
was Ukrainian. He further indicated that he had entered Canada under a
false name, namely Nicolas Schpirka, and had arrived in Canada on
August 14, 1951 on the steamship NELLY. He further indicated the following:
la fin de la 2e guerre mondiale, j"ai quitté les rangs de la LÉGION
ÉTRANGÈRE de France sous les nom et prénom "Nicolas Schpirka" Ref. le
dossier ED-2-37194, Immigration, Montréal. Mes nom et prénom véritables
sont "VLADIMIR KATRIUK".
 On October 10, 1958, the registrar of
Canadian Citizenship, Mr. J.E. Duggan, wrote to the Chief, Admission
Division, Immigration Branch, in the following terms:
Would you please advise this office of
the details surrounding the correct names of Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk and,
if possible, may we have a photo-copy [sic] of any documents on your file relating to their correct names.
 On October 17, 1958, the following reply was sent to the registrar of Canadian Citizenship:
5. The application of Vladimir Katriuk
and his wife Maria Stephanie for amendment of our records, was
favourably considered and due notation has been made to indicate that
Vladimir Katriuk and Maria Katriuk were granted landing (admitted for
permanent residence) at Quebec, P.Q. on August 14th, 1951.
 The Department, by a letter dated May
13, 1958, advised Me Massé that Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk"s application to
correct their names had been accepted. The letter reads as follows:
 As appears from the above passage, the
Department amended its records to indicate that Vladimir Katriuk and
Maria Katriuk had been granted landing in Quebec City on August 14,
1951. As a result, Nicolas Schpirka and Maria Schpirka ceased to exist
as far as the Department was concerned. This explains why Mr. and Mrs.
Katriuk filed their applications for citizenship under their own names.
On November 10, 1958, Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk became Canadian citizens.
 I should point out here that Mr.
Katriuk"s affidavit sworn to in Montreal on October 18, 1957, to
which the Department"s reply of October 17, 1958 refers at
paragraph 2, is not part of the evidence.[WHY NOT?]
I should also point out that Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk"s, or, rather,
Mr. and Mrs. Schpirka"s, applications for permanent residence in Canada
are also not in evidence since the files were destroyed by the
Department in the regular course of its business at the end of the
1950s or early 1960s. [Why should Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk suffer for this?]
[... material deleted ...]
[... material deleted ...]
 It is therefore the Minister"s
position that Mr. Katriuk was a "collaborator", that he participated in
the commission of atrocities against the civilian population in Belarus
while a member of Battalion 118, that he failed to divulge material
circumstances upon applying for permanent residence in Canada in 1951,
including his true identity, and finally that he failed to divulge
material circumstances in 1958 when he applied for Canadian citizenship.
[... legal material deleted ...]
 Before dealing with the Minister"s
allegations, I would like to say a few words on the standard of proof
applicable in these proceedings. Once again, I am in complete agreement
with the statement of the law made by Mr. Justice McKeown in Bogutin
at pages 27 to 29:
[... legal material deleted ...]
 Mr. Katriuk admits that he was a
member of Battalion 115 and, subsequently, of Battalion 118. However,
Mr. Katriuk takes the position, and he testified to the effect that he
did not voluntarily join the battalions. He testified that joining the
battalions was the only alternative to deportation to Germany. In that
regard, his evidence is corroborated by Ivan Serbyn and George
Hiltschuk. Both Mr. Serbyn and Mr. Hiltschuk were Ukrainians from
Bukovina who marched to Kyiv in the fall of 1941 and both became
members of Battalion 118. Mr. Katriuk's evidence that he did not
voluntarily join Battalion 118 was also corroborated by the evidence of
Mr. Savaliy Antonovich Khrenov, whose evidence I took in Nizhniy
Novgorod, Russia, on March 30, 1998. Mr. Khrenov was a soldier in the
Red Army. He had been called for military service in April 1941. He was
part of the Soviet troops that were sent to occupy part of Poland.
After Germany invaded Poland, Mr. Khrenov"s unit retreated to Kyiv
where, in November 1941, he was taken prisoner by the Germans. He was
placed in a prisoners of war camp from which he escaped two months
later. Although Mr. Khrenov was able to hide for a while, the Germans,
on three occasions, tried to deport him to Germany. Each time, he
managed to escape. This is what led him to join Battalion 118 in
1942. At one point during his cross-examination, when asked what
alternative he had to joining Battalion 118, Mr. Khrenov gave the
 On the issue of collaboration and war
crimes, the Minister filed the expert reports of Professors Dr. Frank
Golczewski and Dr. Manfred Messerschmidt. I will begin with the report
of Dr. Golczewski. He received a Ph.D. from Cologne University in 1973
and subsequently studied extensively in the areas of modern and
East-European history. From 1983 to 1994, he taught modern history and,
since 1994, he has been a full professor of East-European history at
the University of Hamburg.
 In his report dated August 3,
1997, Dr. Golczewski discusses the organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists, Kyiv under German occupation until December 1941, the
Bukovina Battalion, the formation of local militias and auxiliary units
in Bukovina, Galicia and Ukraine in the summer and fall of 1941 and the
conditions for the auxiliary formations in occupied Russia.
 At pages 29 to 31 of his report, Professor Golczewski writes as follows:
I know of no case where anybody would have been pressed into
Militia service. If the ?volunteerness? of the personnel is put into
question it is only possible by taking into account the personal
reference frame of the volunteers. Not joining the Militia meant hunger
and material dearth - on one level with the regular population. In
contrast, for POWs only Militia service meant escape from imminent
death. This was balanced, however, by the clear understanding that a
victorious Soviet Union would consider those who joined enemy
para-military or military service to be traitors subject to the death
- that service in the auxiliary units
was voluntary. Only former POWs escaped imminent death by joining
auxiliary units. For the others different incentives were a reason to
make the choice they did,
- that an oath of allegiance was not
required for SSPF (Schutzmannschaft) personnel before later in 1942,
- that the auxiliaries were armed,
though different waves of disarming then took place, and that the
Bukovina Kure[frac12] is said to have started out unarmed.
 At page 32 of his report,
Professor Golczewski comments on Mr.Katriuk's statement in answer to
the Minister"s summary of facts and evidence. Professor Golczewski
The Bukovinians arrived in Kyiv in September or early October
1941. It is not clear if they arrived in Kyiv right along with the
German troops or some days later. Their later arrival would, however,
not have been caused by the planting of mines, but by organizational
priorities on the side of the OUN marching groups.
 I now turn to Dr. Messerschmidt"s
evidence. Dr. Messerschmidt received a Ph.D. from the University of
Freiburg in 1954. In 1958, he obtained a law degree from that
university and a second degree in law from Stuttgart University in
1962. Since 1962, he has been employed by the Research Institute for
military history in Freiburg. In 1970, he became Chief Historian and
has been teaching history since then at the University of Freiburg.
 In his report,
Dr. Messerschmidt discusses the formation of the Auxiliary Police
(Schutzmannschaften) by the Germans. The Auxiliary Police, of which
Battalions 115 and 118 formed part of, were to be used, according to
Dr. Messerschmidt, primarily for security and anti-partisan
warfare in the occupied regions.
 According to Dr. Messerschmidt, as
the Ukrainians were categorized as anti-Polish and pro-German, they
were to be provided with more food and given preference in the staffing
of subordinate administrative positions. Thus, according to
Dr. Messerschmidt, the better treatment accorded to Ukrainians
made it possible to establish "voluntary units" of Auxiliary Police.
 At page 12 of his report, Dr. Messerschmidt poses the following question:
The question is whether there was force involved through coercion or the threat of deportation to forced labour in Germany.
 Dr. Messerschmidt answers his question as follows:
forced recruitment for labour service in the Reich began only in 1942.
Until then it was a matter of "attracting" people, although this was
often done in a very drastic manner. Only in May of 1942, the Army High
Command [OKH] demanded conditions for municipalities; through effective
publicity measures by the mayors, the people should be made to
understand what their duty was. However, residents were also pressed
into service in the Army [Heer] Rear Area. Finally, the greatest number
of forced labourers were recruited for service in the Reich in the
summer of 1942, for the most part women who were employed in German
households (about 800,000 Ukrainian women). These methods were
continued in 1943. The "Reports from the Occupied Areas" ["Meldungen
aus den besetzten Gebieten"], No. 54 of 14 May 1943) characteristically
conclude: "In general it is found that no one can be motivated any
longer to volunteer. However, since in certain places and areas,
contingents for labourers were prescribed, one has no choice but to use
German side was aware that the prospect of a better life with the
German troops was a major motive for prisoners of war. But this very
circumstance shows that prisoners were not forced into collaborative
service. This also would have run counter to the tendency of wanting
only "reliable" prisoners.
 With respect to the participation of
Ukrainians in the Auxiliary Police, Dr. Messerschmidt opines as
follows at pages 17 and 18 of his report:
In Ukraine, the
General Commissar ordered a recruitment campaign for the auxiliary
forces [Schutzmannschaften] on 24 February 1942. The following
conditions were established for membership:
Special mention should be made of the Ukrainian units from
which a large percentage of officers and men transferred into the
Ukrainian Militia battalions. From the German point of view, these
legions that had been organized for an independent Ukraine, certainly
represented an anti-Bolshevist potential which could be utilized for
police purposes, provided that the primary nationalist interests could
be repressed. This goal was not realized with all, but with very many
it could be subordinated to the struggle against Bolshevism. It would
be difficult to find another explanation for the fact that the transfer
was generally achieved without many problems.
According to a memorandum by the Commander of the Order Police
for Ostland of 13.3.1942, the recruitment of volunteers had the effect
that skilled workers were leaving their jobs to join the auxiliaries
[Schutzmannschaften]. In Latvia (according to Event Report
[Ereignismeldung] USSR No. 187) 8000 volunteers had applied by 30 March
1942. Volunteers were also recruited for the Lithuanian auxiliaries
The general rules also provided that members of the Schutzmannschaften could file an application for discharge.
 After these comments, Dr.
Messerschmidt then turns his attention to Militia Battalions 115 and
118 and Mr. Katriuk's participation, on a voluntary basis, in these
battalions. At pages 18 and 19, Dr. Messerschmidt writes the following:
Both battalions belonged to the area of Higher SS and
Police Leader Russia South and Ukraine. For battalions in this area,
the numbers 101 to 200 had been allocated.) It was thus determined that
the bulk of the members were to be Ukrainians. The occupying power
proceeded accordingly in Kyiv when the battalions were set up.
The question is to what extent the prescribed volunteer principle was indeed maintained.
V. Katriuk (the Respondent will hitherto be referred to as R)
has claimed that he was enlisted [eingestellt] after his arrival in
Kyiv (November or December 1941) and indicated that this was his only
alternative, i.e. to deportation for slave labour in the Reich. He
claims that soon after, Battalion 118 was formed from prisoners of war
who also had the alternative to be brutally treated and to starve in
the prisoner of war camp. The respondent says that he had been
transferred with his company into Battalion 118. In this manner, he
says, the Germans had tried to suppress the nationalist feelings of the
Schutzmannschaften and that this was how they had treated the
"volunteers". He says that an oath of solidarity had therefore not been
R. bases his claim that he did not join Battalion 115 voluntarily on two arguments:
He describes the overall situation as if Battalions 115 and 118 had been purely compulsory units [Zwangseinrichtungen].
The above indications concerning the German policy in terms of
Ukrainian nationalism speak against R"s claim. Neither does the
implication hold true that the Bukovina Ukrainians in November/early
December 1941 were given the alternative of doing either forced labour
in the Reich or police duty. Of the 15,000, only some entered the
battalions. It cannot be determined whether the rest were taken to
Germany. This is unlikely, because at that time there were no scheduled
deportations to forced labour, and also because volunteer recruitment
was still carried out in 1942.
This leads to the conclusion that the Higher SS and Police
Leader [HSSPF] and the local authorities were supported by Ukrainian
helpers in establishing the Militia battalions in Kyiv.
How can the Respondent"s comments be reconciled with these
circumstances? Prior to the occupation of the Bukovina [Bukowina] by
the USSR, R. was a Romanian citizen and a member of the Ukrainian
minority. When the Wehrmacht ended the one-year Soviet rule in the
summer of 1941, R. was barely 20 years old. As a non-Romanian and as a
Ukrainian activist, he joined a volunteer unit whose aim was to act as
a Ukrainian force to bring about an independent Ukraine. For that
reason, this organization of Southwest Ukrainians marched for 3 months
to Kyiv, where upon its arrival in November/December 1941 it was housed
in former barracks of the USSR security forces. The trident flag was
unfurled, which the German side did not allow.
No one mentioned that the leading Ukrainian officers in Kyiv
were executed by the Germans, although questions about the instructors
[Instrukteure] were raised during the interview [Vernehmung]. With this
claim, R stands alone. Such action on the German side would be in
contrast to the fact that the commander, the company heads
[Kompaniechefs] as well as the platoon and group leaders [Zug - und
Gruppenführer] in Battalion 118 were Ukrainians. In my opinion, R"s
statements must be seen in connection with his position and role in the
battalion. In contrast to the Ordnungsdienst unit (910 men) made up of
Ukrainian prisoners of war released in Minsk, where the question of
finding suitable Ukrainian leaders could not be solved, such complaints
did not become known about Battalion 118. Obviously the German
supervisory officers [Aufsichtsoffiziere] appointed by Decree [Erlaß]
of Reichsführer SS [RFSS] of 6 November 1941 were fully satisfied with
the performance and attitude of their Ukrainian comrades. R. was a
Group Leader [Gruppenführer] in Platoon 1 [1.Zug] of Company 1
[1.Kompanie]. The company consisted primarily, or almost completely of
Western Ukrainians. It was the best armed and can be described as the
elite of the battalion. In his Group [Gruppe], R. was in charge of
These indications do not fit into the picture of forced
service which was painted by R. He does not mention at all that he
served in Company 1 and that he was awarded a medal for his activities.
 Then Dr. Messerschmidt addresses the field of operation of Battalion 118 [in Belarus]
[... material deleted ...]
[This material in sections 52, 53, 54,
55, 56 refers to German military actions against partisan activity in
Belarus from March to August of 1943 and attempts to implicate
Battalion 118 (and, by association, Mr. Katriuk) in atrocities against
the civilian population of Belarus.]
 The picture painted by Dr.
Messerschmidt is quite different from the story related by Mr. Katriuk.
It will be recalled that Mr. Katriuk testified that his company had
never participated in any major military operation. Mr. Katriuk also
testified that, in Pleshchenitsi and Evye, he had not fired his gun.
Further, Mr. Katriuk reiterated in his testimony what he stated in
paragraphs 13, 17 and 18 of his statement in response to the Minister"s
summary of facts and evidence. He added that, while in Minsk for three
to four weeks, Battalion 118 underwent training exercises every day.
Mr. Katriuk related the same story in regard to Battalion 118"s
presence in Pleshchenitsi, that the battalion underwent training
exercises every day and that it guarded its barracks and a bridge on
the main road. The battalion would have remained in Pleshchenitsi for
two to three months and would never have left town.
 In Evye, Battalion 118, according
to Mr. Katriuk, was housed in a school where the men were packed as
"herrings in bunk-beds". Battalion 118 patrolled the town to show the
population that it was there to protect them from the enemy.
 I will now contrast Mr. Katriuk's
testimony with that of Mr. Khrenov. Mr. Khrenov joined Battalion
118 in 1942. He was in the third platoon of the first company of
Battalion 118. He remembers Mr. Katriuk was a member of the first
company. He also remembers that Mr. Katriuk was from Western Ukraine.
Mr. Khrenov confirmed Mr. Katriuk's testimony that, while in Kyiv,
Battalion 118 underwent training. He also remembered that the battalion
had participated in an operation against partisans outside Chernigov.
He added, however, that as things turned out, the first company had not
been involved in the fighting.
 Mr. Khrenov then testified that
the battalion had been transferred to Minsk, either at the end of 1942
or the beginning of 1943. He testified that in Minsk, the battalion
underwent training. He could not remember how long the battalion had
remained in Minsk. He remembered that the battalion was transferred
from Minsk to Pleshchenitsi some time in 1943. He remembered
celebrating Christmas of 1942 in Pleshchenitsi. When asked in
cross-examination whether his company had been involved in military
action while in Pleshchenitsi, Mr. Khrenov answered "of course".
 Mr. Khrenov explained that the
first company "wasn"t always involved in things in its entirety.
Sometimes, it would be involved as a platoon or as a unit". He then
added that it was difficult to remember "all these things".
 He testified that he had
participated in the burning of the village of Chmelevisci. When asked
whether Mr. Katriuk had participated in this operation, he answered
that he could not say but that he could say that the company "was
 Mr. Khrenov also testified with
respect to an incident which occurred on the road between Pleshchenitsi
and Logoisk. A member of the battalion had been killed while repairing
telephone lines. The first company was sent to the site of the
incident. Mr. Khrenov stated that he saw dead bodies lying on the
ground. Mr. Khrenov also saw woodcutters being escorted by the third
 Mr. Khrenov remembers leaving the
Pleshchenitsi region in the summer of 1943 "for some big operation".
The battalion then went to Novogrudok. In the fall of 1943, the company
went to Evye, where a number of operations were carried out. He
remembers fighting partisans near the village of Morino. Mr. Khrenov
remembers Mr. Katriuk as being the Commander of the first unit of the
first platoon of the first company. When asked how he would describe
the way Mr. Katriuk behaved during operations, Mr. Khrenov answered the
Q. And meaning he [Katriuk] was at what, the vanguard of the advancement?
A. Well, for instance, there was an incident
when he brought a partisan to the battalion where - to the place where
the battalion was deployed. Then, they formed up the company in one
line. And this partisan, walked along the line to recognize faces of
certain people. And he recognized two (2) people, who had wanted to
make contact with the partisans. And the man that Katriuk brought
recognized two (2) individuals. And then, those two (2) individuals
were taken away. |
Q. So, it was Mr. Katriuk who brought this person in to identify the others?
Q. How was Mr. Katriuk viewed by his men?
A. Well, there were always good relations. They
were all fellow countrymen, and they were all friends. |
Q. Okay, in respect of the manner in which he
proceeded during the operations, how was his attitude towards fighting?
I didn"t go with him at all, never, but, in
general, I can say he was an active participant, but, personally, I had
no contact with him.
A. Well, as I said, I was always with the cannon. So we didn"t participate.
Q. Finally, did anybody in the first company ever get medals or awards?
About seventy percent (70%), not less than
seventy percent (70%) of the people in the first company got awards
sometime in the spring of 1944, and he also got an award.
A. He was also given an award.
[It is rather amusing how the prosecution
and Judge Nadon attempt to cast negative aspersions against Mr. Katriuk
for having been awarded a medal. Medals are a very common public
relations exercise within the military establishments throughout the
world. It is a very cheap way to express appreciation to the "human
cannon fodder" for carrying out dangerous and dehumanizing tasks. We
note that Judge Nadon NEVER refers to the medal and supporting
certificate presented by the French military to Mr. Katriuk in
appreciation for his bravery in fighting against the Germans in France.]
 To complete Mr. Khrenov"s testimony, I
should state that he was also part of the battalion created from the
remains of Battalions 115 and 118 which was sent to France and from
which a number of men defected to the FFL in 1944. In contrast to Mr.
Katriuk, Mr. Khrenov did not join the FFL and, as a result, returned to
Russia. After being tried, he was found guilty of being a traitor to
his country and was sentenced to be executed. After two months on
"death row", Mr. Khrenov"s sentence was converted to twenty years of
forced labour. After having served thirteen years in prison, Mr.
Khrenov was released. He explained that Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine
were the ones that returned to Russia. The Western Ukrainians did not
return. They remained in France.
[If Mr. Katriuk had returned to Ukraine,
Mr. Katriuk's fate would have been rather similar to that of the ethnic
Russian, Mr. Khrenov. Except that Ukrainian Nationalists were viewed
with even more disfavor. And in the concentration camps scattered
across the vast Gulag Archipelago as documented so well by Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, the survival rate of Ukrainians was substantially less
than that of ethnic Russians.]
 In view of the evidence of Dr.
Messerschmidt and Mr. Khrenov, I find it difficult, if not impossible,
to accept Mr. Katriuk's evidence that he did not participate in any
important military operation while his battalion was in Belarus. That
is simply not plausible. I find that Mr. Katriuk must have participated
in at least some of the operations in which his battalion was involved
between 1942 and 1944. Mr. Katriuk was an active member of the
battalion and was in charge of one unit of platoon number 1 of company
1. Mr. Khrenov remembers him as an "active participant". I can
only conclude that Mr. Katriuk, as a member of Battalion 118, took part
in the operations in which his company was involved and, as a result,
was certainly engaged in fighting enemy partisans.
 Although I have no difficulty
concluding that Mr. Katriuk participated in the operations in which his
company was involved, I am not prepared, on the evidence before me, to
conclude that he participated in the commission of atrocities against
the civilian population of Belarus. Not enough is known to reach any
conclusion. The Minister did not call any witnesses, save Mr. Khrenov,
with respect to the events on which Dr. Messerschmidt relies in
coming to his conclusions. The Minister called Mr. Khrenov but his
evidence does not support the Minister"s contention that Mr. Katriuk
committed atrocities or participated in the commission of atrocities
against the civilian population of Belarus. Consequently, I am of the
view that Dr. Messerschmidt"s expert evidence is not sufficient to
support the conclusion which the Minister seeks. Dr. Messerschmidt
is an expert historian. He relies, like Dr. Golczewski, on a number of
documents in order to reach his conclusions. However,
Dr. Messerschmidt, it goes without saying, has no personal
knowledge of the events which he relates in his report. It would be
unthinkable, in my view, to conclude, on the basis of Dr.
Messerschmidt"s evidence only, that Mr. Katriuk committed war crimes. I
therefore find that the Minister has not proved, on a balance of
probabilities, that Mr. Katriuk participated in the commission of war
crimes or that he committed such crimes. The Minister did not call any
witnesses who could link Mr. Katriuk to the atrocities committed
against the civilian population.
 I now turn to the issue of whether
Mr. Katriuk "voluntarily" joined Battalion 118. Both Drs.
Golczewski and Messerschmidt are of the view that Mr. Katriuk must have
voluntarily joined Battalion 118. At page 31 of his report,
Dr. Golczewski recognizes that refusal to join the Militia could
lead to "hunger and material dearth". He dismisses Mr. Katriuk's
evidence that the only alternative to joining a battalion was
deportation to Germany because "deportation or forced labour on a
non-voluntary basis started only later in 1942". According to Dr.
Golczewski, joining a battalion "was not the only solution. It was a
more expedient one". Dr. Messerschmidt is, for slightly different
reasons, also of the view that Mr. Katriuk voluntarily joined
 As I indicated earlier, Mr.
Katriuk testified that joining a battalion was the only alternative to
being deported to Germany. In that respect, I have already referred to
the evidence of Messrs. Serbyn, Hiltschuk and Khrenov.
 This issue is not easy to decide.
For those of us who did not participate in the Second World War, or for
that matter in any war, it is almost impossible to imagine the
difficult choices men and women had to make during the course of that
war. In the circumstances which prevailed at that time, "voluntary
service" may well have been a relative term. As
Professor Golczewski himself recognizes, there were many reasons
why a man could have decided to join a battalion. To name a few,
deportation, hunger, possible death, etc.. It must be remembered that
Professor Golczewski"s opinion is all encompassing. All those who
joined the battalions, save for prisoners of war like Mr. Khrenov,
did so voluntarily. That cannot, in my view, possibly be true. No doubt
many men did join the battalions of their own free will. It cannot also
be doubted that many did not join of their own free will but did so
either to avoid deportation, hunger or perhaps death. When asked by
counsel for Anne McLellan why he did not leave Battalion 118, Mr.
Katriuk answered by saying "where could we go? To the Red Partisans, or
maybe to the Polish Partisans?".
[It must be remembered that, in Belarus,
Mr. Katriuk was in hostile territory. In certain parts of Ukraine, Mr.
Katriuk would, at least, have had a theoretical chance of deserting and
trying to reach the UPA.]
 It is interesting to compare the
statements made by Drs. Golczewski and Messerschmidt with those that
are made by Professor Subtelny in his book Ukraine A History. At pages 471 to 473, under the heading Collaboration, Professor Subtelny writes:
In dealing with the Nazis, the Ukrainians had
two alternatives: to obey or to resist. As throughout all of
German-occupied Europe, the vast majority chose obedience. And when
obedience went beyond the limits of the passive fulfillment of German
commands, it usually became collaboration. In Western Europe, where
loyalty to one"s state was taken for granted and the Nazis were the one
and only enemy, collaboration with the Germans was generally viewed as
a form of treason. But in Ukraine, collaboration was a much more
complicated issue. It was, first of all, unclear as to how much loyalty
Ukrainians owed to Stalin"s regime or to the Polish state that had
mistreated them. Who was the primary enemy? Was it the Stalinist
system, which inflicted such great suffering in the 1930s, or the Nazi
regime, which was currently (but perhaps only temporarily) in power?
Finally, given the extreme ruthlessness of both regimes in Ukraine,
collaboration was often the price of survival for many Ukrainians.
For Ukrainians the war posed the
problem of how to make the best of what was essentially a no-win
situation. From an average individual"s point of view, success
generally meant the preservation of one"s life. For Ukrainian leaders
and their organizations in German-occupied territories the goal - or
rather, the puzzle - was how to preserve Ukrainian interests from both
the Nazis and the increasingly stronger Soviets. Distasteful as it was,
some Ukrainian leaders decided to side with one totalitarian system in
order to withstand the other. Because the Soviets appeared to be the
greater long-term threat, almost all Ukrainian organizations in the
Third Reich collaborated with the Germans at one time or another, but
always to a limited degree and for strictly tactical reasons. As a
people without a state of their own, Ukrainians operated from a
position of weakness. They were unable to formulate policy or influence
events. Consequently, Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis was
insignificant compared to that of Germany"s allies. Finally, although
there were opportunists, anti-Semites, and ideological fanatics among
the Ukrainians, there is no evidence indicating that their number was
proportionally greater than among other nationalities.
On the individual level, collaboration
with the Germans usually took the form of participation in the local
administration of the German-supervised auxiliary police. Motives for
taking such positions varied. In Western Ukraine, where, before the
war, Poles had excluded Ukrainians from even the lowest administrative
positions, the desire to have at least a minimum of authority in
Ukrainian hands and to turn the tables on hated rivals was often a
major motive. The need to find employment or to satisfy personal
ambitions was, as always, an important consideration. The most
notorious form of collaboration was to act as a concentration camp
guard. Invariably, guard positions were held by Soviet prisoners of
war, who had the difficult choice of accepting the task or perishing in
Given the lowly position of Ukrainian collaborators in the Nazi apparatus and the ss
monopoly on the actual extermination of Jews, Ukrainian participation
in the massacres was neither extensive nor decisive. When it did occur,
it usually took the form of auxiliary policemen herding Jews into
ghettos. However, there were also many Ukrainians who risked the death
penalty by aiding Jews. Metropolitan Sheptytsky was an outstanding
example: not only did he shelter hundreds of Jews in monasteries but he
also used his sermons to decry the Nazi slaughter of Jews. In 1943 an ss
report to Himmler stated that the metropolitan was adamantly opposed to
the Nazi anti-Semitic outrages and that he had come to consider nazism
to be an even greater evil than communism.
Aside from the abortive interlude
between the OUN and the Germans in the early days of the war, the most
important case of Ukrainian cooperation with Hitler"s regime on the
organizational level was the formation of the ss volunteer
Galicia Division. In spring 1943, after the stunning German defeat at
Stalingrad, Nazi authorities belatedly decided to recruit non-German
"easterners" into their forces. Consequently, Otto Wächter, the
governor of Galicia, approached the Ukrainian General Committee (UCC)
with a proposal to form a Ukrainian division in the German army. After
much debate and despite opposition from the OUN-B, Kubijovych and his
associates agreed. Their immediate reason for the creation of such a
division was the hope that it might help to improve German treatment of
the Ukrainians. The specter of 1917-20 was also extremely influential
in persuading the UCC leadership, for Kubijovych and his associates (as
well as Metropolitan Sheptytsky himself) were convinced that it was the
lack of a well-trained army that had prevented Ukrainians from
establishing their own state after the First World War. Realizing that
the defeat of Germany was probable, they were determined that this time
Ukrainians would not be caught in the ensuing chaos without a regular
military force. It should be emphasized that both the Ukrainian
organizers of the division and its members were motivated primarily by
patriotic and anti-Soviet motives, not by pro-Nazi sympathies.
In the negotiations leading up to the
formation of the division, the UCC insisted that the unit fight only
against the Soviets. Wächter, on Himmler"s instructions, demanded that
the entire higher divisional command be German and, in order not to
irritate Hitler, that the division be called Galician rather than
Ukrainian. When the UCC called for volunteers in June 1943, over 83,000
men responded. Of these, 13,000 eventually became members of the ss
Volunteer Galicia Division.
The men of the Galician Division were
not the only Ukrainians in Hitler"s armies. Scattered among the
approximately 1 million former Soviet citizens who wore German uniforms
in 1944 were about 220,000 Ukrainians (most of the others were
Russians). To put these numbers into perspective, it should be
remembered that about 2 million Ukrainians fought on the Soviet side
and that large numbers also fought in Polish, Romanian, Hungarian,
Czech, American, and Canadian forces. Such was the fate of a stateless
 There is no evidence that Mr. Katriuk,
prior to August of 1944, made any attempt to leave Battalion 118. This,
in any event, would be most surprising since leaving the battalion
might have been considered to be desertion and would perhaps have
resulted in the firing squad. On the other hand, a man could leave to
join the partisans and fight against Germany which, in the end, is what
Mr. Katriuk did in August of 1944 when he and others joined the FFI.
 On the evidence before me, I
cannot accept Mr. Katriuk's evidence that refusal to join
Battalions 115 and 118 necessarily meant deportation or forced
labour. Rather, I am of the view that Mr. Katriuk joined the battalions
for a number of reasons, possibly including better living conditions
and avoiding hunger. Another possible reason for joining a battalion
was that Ukrainians, at least for a short period of time, preferred the
Germans to the Russians and were prepared to fight against their former
oppressors. In the end, I must agree with Dr. Golczewski that Mr.
Katriuk decided that joining a battalion was the lesser evil of the
choices that life was offering him at that time. In reaching this
conclusion, I wish to make it clear that I do not believe that Mr.
Katriuk was entirely candid in relating his participation in Battalion
118. He clearly was not prepared to answer fully the questions put to
him regarding his participation in Battalion 118 and, more
particularly, in company number 1 of that battalion. In my view, he was
only prepared to testify with respect to generalities and not to
specifics. This does not, however, lead me to infer that Mr. Katriuk
was trying to conceal that he had committed or participated in the
Commission of war crimes. As I indicated earlier, Anne McLellan did not
adduce any evidence, other than that of the expert historians, to prove
her allegation that Mr. Katriuk had committed war crimes. In reaching
that conclusion, I am perfectly conscious of the fact that the
victorious powers, which include Canada, are the ones that decided what
collaboration meant and who collaborators were. For reasons which will
appear later on, this finding is not, in any event, determinative of
the questions which I must answer.
[We are puzzled by the flip-flop in
reasoning of Judge Nadon in the above paragraph. Of course, Mr. Katriuk
joined the schutzmannschaft as a lesser evil than being a slave
labourer in Germany or facing almost certain death in a POW camp. Does
Judge Nadon expect that the Germans would have set a bunch of Ukrainian
In Webster's New World Dictionary (1959), we find the following definition:
collaborator, a person who works with another or others, as in writing a book
collaborate, 1. to work together: especially in reference to literary, artistic, or scientific work
2. to co-operate with the enemy; be a collaborationist
Normally, the term collaborator, suggesting that people are working
together, does not carry a negative connotation. I doubt that the
second definition of collaborate, to co-operate with the enemy,
appeared in dictionaries prior to 1939. That definition appears to have
been coined in the aftermath of WWII. In fact, in the documents from
the post-war period presented by Judge Nadon below, the term
collaborator first appears in the July 26, 1948 letter of
Superintendent George B. McClelland, RCMP, Ottawa to Major J.A. Wright,
RCMP, London. (see section ).
But even the definition "to co-operate with the enemy" is subjective
and does not necessarily carry a negative connotation. For the enemy
obviously views the co-operating person in a positive sense.
Furthermore, virtually every person in German-occupied Europe
co-operated with the enemy and could, thus, be labelled as a
collaborator. For the occupying authority carries the power of life or
death over every inhabitant. You either co-operate or you are arrested,
incarcerated, tortured and even shot.
Perhaps in Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, one
could obtain a general concensus (though no unanimity) as to which of
their citizens were collaborators. But in Central and Eastern Europe,
especially in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States, the issue is far
from clear. Even in present-day Ukraine, there is a raging debate
between the Nationalists and the Communists as to whether members of
the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) or the Galicia Division were heros
or traitors. The issue is completely subjective.
For people, who were coerced to work in German-controlled police units
or in the civil administration, the issue is still more murky. Should
Vladimir Katriuk not have guarded the flour mill, which produced bread
for both the Germans and the inhabitants of Kyiv? Should he have
allowed it to be blown up by Communist saboteurs, which would have
caused still more food shortages and famine in the city? And in
far-away Belarus, where Mr. Katriuk guarded a Polish village from
partisan attacks and is even alleged to have participated in military
campaigns against partisans, should he have allowed the Communist
partisans to slaughter the Polish villagers, because they would not
submit to Soviet domination? And even if he did, indeed, participate in
the German campaigns against the partisans, would he be in a position
to know who was friend and who was foe from a Ukrainian standpoint?
The concept of collaboration can be carried to such a ridiculous
extreme that a Ukrainian girl, who was raped by a German soldier, could
be classified as a collaborator for providing sexual gratification to
her rapist. But her sister, who was raped by a Russian soldier, would
be classified as a hero of the Soviet Union.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of free
and independent states in Central and Eastern Europe, it is the people
who supported the Communists, who are considered to be collaborators.
The above discussion indicates that the issue of collaboration should
not have been, and cannot be today, a criterion as to who should be and
who should not be allowed to immigrate to Canada. So how and why did
the "collaborator" criterion become such an important issue with
Canadian politicians and bureaucrats struggling with post-WWII
immigration? We suggest that it is the result of the demonic
collaboration between the Holocaust Industry and the KGB/NKVD. We have
already noted the collaboration between the Zionists and NKVD/MVD
Smersh units in the wake of the Red Army advancing through Ukraine.
After WWII, it was in the interests of both to portray prospective
immigrants from Eastern Europe in a negative light as war criminals and
collaborators. This negative stereotyping facilitated the forcible
repatriation of Ukrainian, Cossack, Yugoslav and other refugees to the
tender mercies of Stalin and Tito. It discredited the UPA struggle for
Ukrainian independence, which lasted into the 1950s. It facilitated the
mass migration of Jews in late 1945 to 1948 from the Soviet-controlled
zone into the Allied-controlled zones of Europe from where they were
allowed to immigrate to Palestine and North America.
We conclude that the term "collaborator" is not a suitable criterion
for immigration purposes and should not be an issue in the d/d show
trials being staged by Anne McLellan and her minions.
FAILURE TO DIVULGE MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES UPON APPLYING FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN CANADA IN 1951.
 It is not disputed that Mr. Katriuk
misrepresented his identity when he applied for a visa in Paris in
1951. Consequently, Mr. Katriuk concealed material circumstances when
applying for permanent residence in Canada. However, by reason of his
application in 1957 to have his name changed from Schpirka to Katriuk,
it does not necessarily follow that Mr. Katriuk obtained his Canadian
citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing
 On this issue, Lucienne
Robillard's position is that there was in existence in 1951 a system
which provided for screening of immigrants based on the information
which they provided in their application forms and, in particular,
information regarding their residences and employments from 1938 until
the date of their applications. Lucienne Robillard submits that this
system could only be effective if applicants provided accurate and
truthful information regarding their identity and their history, as
requested in the application form and reviewed during a visa-vetting
[The above statement presupposes that such a system existed in reality.]
 Lucienne Robillard submits that,
when the applicant applied to come to Canada in 1951, persons found to
be collaborators were not admissible. According to Lucienne Robillard,
there was a blanket exclusion in regard to "collaborators".
[As we have indicated above, every human
being on the planet can be defined to be a collaborator. The term does
not normally carry a negative connotation. Judge Nadon himself can be
fairly accused of collaborating with Anne McLellan to bring Canada's
system of justice into disrepute. We have shown above that the negative
connotation of the word arose from the hysteria and hypocrisy of the
Second World War.]
 I will now briefly review Canada"s immigration policy8
concerning the entry into Canada of "undesirable" persons and the manner in which the government chose to implement its policy.
 By the end of the Second World
War, Canada"s immigration policy was still subject to an order in
adopted in 1931 pursuant to the Immigration Act,
R.S. 1927, c. 93 (the "Immigration Act, 1927
As a result, it was quite difficult, if not impossible, for immigrants
from countries other than the United Kingdom, the United States,
Ireland and the Dominions to come to Canada as permanent residents.
There were up to six hundred thousand displaced persons at the end of
the war. Thus, Canada was not in a position to accept the large-scale
immigration which resulted from the war.
[Judge Nadon does not reveal who these refugees were and why they would be given favored status.]
 From 1945 to 1947, Cabinet held
many discussions with a view to "relaxing" the provisions of the 1931
order in council. In October 1945, an order in council10
was passed so as to allow refugees who had entered Canada during the
war to obtain landed status. In January 1947, Cabinet decided that a
number of statutes would either be repealed or amended to end racial
discrimination, particularly as concerned persons of Asian origin.
 On May 1, 1947, the Prime Minister
of Canada, the Right Honourable Mackenzie King, made the following
statement in the House of Commons:
policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of
Canada by the encouragement of immigration. The government will seek by
legislation, by regulation, and vigorous administration, to ensure the
careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of
immigrants as can advantageously be absorbed in our national economy.
Because of the limitation of
transport, the government decided that, as respects immigration from
Europe, the emphasis for the present should be on the admission of the
relatives of persons who are already in Canada, and on assisting in the
resettlement of displaced persons and refugees.
The government is sending immigration
officers to examine the situation among the refugee groups, and to take
steps looking towards the early admission of some thousands of their
number. In developing this group movement, the immigration branch and
the Department of Labour will determine jointly the approximate number
of persons who can be readily placed in employment and absorbed into
various industries and occupations. Selection officers will then
consider applicants for entry into Canada, examine them on a basis for
suitability and physical fitness, and make arrangements for their
orderly movement and placement. Persons so admitted will, of course, be
included in whatever quota Canada finally accepts as its share in
meeting the general problem. In taking these steps the government is
seeking to ensure that the displaced persons admitted to Canada are of
a type likely to make good citizens.
Let me now speak of the government"s
long term programme. It is based on the conviction that Canada needs
population. The government is strongly of the view that our immigration
policy should be devised in a positive sense, with the definite
objective, as I have already stated, of enlarging the population of the
country. This it will seeks [sic
] to attain through the development and energetic application of productive immigration measures.
The population of Canada at present is
about 12,000,000. By 1951, in the absence of immigration, it is
estimated that our population would be less than 13,000,000 and that by
1971, without immigration, the population would be approximately
14,600,000. Apart from all else, in a world of shrinking distances and
international insecurity, we cannot ignore the danger that lies in a
small population attempting to hold so great a heritage as ours.
[Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk fit this policy objective perfectly.]
 Between June 1947 and the fall of
1948, Cabinet, by way of orders in council, agreed to accept up to
40,000 displaced persons destined for the bulk labour category, i.e.
woods and garment workers, construction workers, utilities labourers,
domestics and special workers.
[They were obviously discussing KGB
infiltration. Unfortunately, as we have indicated elsewhere, it is
likely that the RCMP had already been infiltrated by a KGB mole.]
 In deciding to broaden the
categories of immigrants admissible to Canada, security remained a
major concern of Cabinet. The Gouzenko spy scandal,11
in the fall of 1945, did nothing to alleviate Cabinet"s concern in that
regard. In the spring of 1946, a decision was taken to establish a
Security Panel for the purpose of coordinating the planning,
organization and execution of security measures throughout the
Government of Canada. The first meeting of the Security Panel took
place on June 24, 1946. Its members were the Secretary to the
Cabinet, senior security officials of the Armed Services, External
Affairs, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ("R.C.M.P."). The
Chairman of the Panel was Arnold Heeney, the Secretary to the Cabinet
and the senior Deputy Minister.
 At its second meeting on July 8,
1946, the Security Panel discussed the issue of "undesirable aliens"
entering Canada and it was noted that there did not exist any Canadian
organization responsible for the screening of prospective immigrants
abroad on grounds of security. A committee was formed to examine the
feasibility of enacting new regulations with respect to the refusal of
immigrants for reasons of security.
[Repeat: Communist infiltration.]
 At its meeting of August 5, 1946,
the Panel decided that screening should be dealt with by way of
administrative action rather than by legislation. The rationale for
this decision appears to have been Cabinet"s desire for its concerns
regarding security screening of prospective immigrants to remain
[Repeat: Communist infiltration.]
 In August 1946, the Security Panel
recommended that the R.C.M.P. should be sent to Europe to assist
immigration officers. Specifically, R.C.M.P. officers would have the
responsibility of screening prospective immigrants on grounds of
security. The Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. agreed with this proposal
and a team of officers was sent to London at the end of October 1946.
In a letter dated October 23, 1946, the Commissioner, S.T. Wood,
indicated to Sergeant W.W. Hinton that his duties in London would be
5. Your duties will be to check the names
of any potential Canadian immigrants passed to you by the Immigration
Branch, Ottawa, through External Affairs. These names will be checked
against records available at the British Passport Control Department of
the Foreign Office, the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police, and
against any other records which may from time to time be opened to you,
such as, the Security Control Section, A.N.G.
6. Names of potential immigrants will
be supplied to you on individual application forms which have first
been subject to a check at this headquarters. The result of this check
will be noted on the form itself. Such forms will be dispatched by the
Immigration Branch, Ottawa, to External Affairs, and will then be
transmitted by diplomatic bag to London.
7. When you find that an applicant has
a record which indicates it would be undesirable to admit him to
Canada, you will mark the form "not clear for security" and return it
to the Immigration Branch, Ottawa, through the same channel, i.e., the
High Commissioner"s Office for transmission by diplomatic bag.
8. Forms on applicants having no
unfavourable record will be marked "clear for security" and dispatched
to the Immigration Branch, Ottawa, in the same manner.
9. In each case where an applicant is
rejected by you on security grounds, you will compile a report to this
headquarters stating the source of your information and the grounds for
rejection. These reports will also be forwarded by diplomatic bag.
10. All reports both to Immigration Department and this headquarters will be classified as "secret."
11. In deciding what factors
render a potential immigrant undesirable you will be guided by the
verbal instructions given at this headquarters. You will also pay
attention to any additional information you may be able to secure from
your U.K. contacts as to the background and status of any organizations
which have not been specifically dealt with or with which you may not
12. The objective is to deny admission
to any persons who, from their known history and background, would be
unlikely to adapt themselves to the Canadian way of life and to our
system of Democratic government. [Emphasis added]
[Repeat: Communist infiltration.]
[85a] May 29, 1947; Operation Matchbox - selected German scientists and experts allowed to immigrate to Canada.
As early as 1947, Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans from outside Germany)
were permitted into Canada. (Program was subsidized by Canadian
government at $10,000 per month.)
 In a secret memorandum for the
Security Panel dated March 30, 1948, the Secretary of the Panel pointed
out that, as of that date, the R.C.M.P. security staff at the London
office was comprised of one officer, one sergeant, one civilian clerk
and two stenographers.
 On May 10, 1948, the Commissioner
of the R.C.M.P. wrote to L.L. Keenleyside, the Deputy Minister of the
Immigration Branch. In his letter, the Commissioner indicated the
I am inclined to think that Mr. Fortier12
is of the opinion that our personnel stationed Overseas have
responsibilities and a scope far beyond their actual duties. This Force
is not conducting an intelligence organization Overseas in the accepted
sense of the term nor, for that matter, a counter-intelligence
organization. These men are appointed for the sole purpose of
checking, insofar as is possible, the backgrounds of persons who have
made application for admission to Canada. These included Displaced
Persons in Germany and applicants from other countries on Continental
Europe particularly those within the Soviet zone of influence.
We are interested mainly in obtaining
a satisfactory answer to two questions: first, what were the
applicant"s sympathies and activities during the late war, and second,
is he sympathetic to Communism or any other form of subversive
influence opposed to our democratic way of life.
is one difficulty which we encounter in dealing with persons coming
from countries in Western Europe, etc., within the Soviet zone of
influence. In such cases a period of approximately 15 days is allowed
to this Force to make a security check. If no report is forthcoming
from this Force at that time it is quite customary to allow the person
to proceed. With conditions in Europe today it is often very difficult
to get a report in such a short time as we are dependent on the good
offices of the security forces belonging to such countries. As a
result, we have had several instances of persons being admitted to
Canada who, had they been checked prior to their arrival, would
certainly not have been cleared for security. A number of these people
are still in this country and must be kept under some form of
observation for a considerable time to come.
We have been endeavouring to
arrange to place security officers at various Canadian Legations in
Western Europe. Due to lack of space this has not been possible
heretofore but we are, with the assistance of the Department of
External Affairs, endeavouring to overcome this obstacle. [Emphasis added]
[Repeat: Communist infiltration. Still no reference to Nazis, collaborators, etc.
However, we must note that 1946 to 1948 were the years that the
Holocaust Industry came of age. The infamous Nurnberg War Crimes
Trials, where the Victors judged the Vanquished and ignored their own
crimes, ellicited enormous sympathy for Jewish aspirations. Right on
cue, the state of Israel was proclaimed in 1948, thus creating the
"Palestinian problem" which lingers to the present day. The flood of
Jewish immigrants from behind the Iron Curtain reached a crescendo.]
 In a letter dated July 26, 1948,
George B. McClelland, Superintendent, and the officer in charge of
Special Branch of the R.C.M.P., wrote to Major J.A. Wright, posted to
Canada House in London. In his letter, Superintendent McClelland, in
discussing the rejection of applicants for immigration to Canada on the
basis of enemy nationality, makes the following points:
4. It is felt here, therefore, that the
following policy should be adopted. We will clear the individual for
security provided there are no other grounds for rejection such as
known Communist, criminal, collaborator, etc. The matter of
whether or not he or she should be accepted on a straight nationality
basis should then be left to the Visa Officer.
5. This point was discussed with Mr. Congdon and Colonel Fortier here in some detail and they agreed.
6. Would you, therefore, have these
instructions conveyed to our men in Germany and Austria and also to our
personnel situated at Rome, The Hague, Brussels, Paris, etc. [Emphasis
[First mention of collaborator.]
 In a R.C.M.P. memorandum dated
November 20, 1948, entitled "Screening of applicants for admission to
Canada", the following categories of immigrants are stated to be
non-admissible to Canada:
(a) Communist, known or strongly suspected.
Communist agitator or suspected Communist Agent.
(b) Member of SS or German Wehrmacht.
Found to bear mark of SS Blood Group (NON Germans).
(c) Member of Nazi Party.
(d) Criminal (known or suspected).
(e) Professional gambler.
(g) Black Market Racketeer.
(h) Evasive and untruthful under interrogation.
(i) Failure to produce recognizable and
acceptable documents as to time of entry and residence in Germany.
(j) False presentation; use of false or fictitious name.
(k) Collaborators presently residing in previously occupied territory.
(l) Member of the Italian Fascist Party or of the Mafia.
(m) Trotskyite or member of other revolutionary organization. [Emphasis added]
[We note that Judge Nadon highlights
items (j) and (k). Under item (j), the majority of immigrants could
probably be found to have misrepresented something or other. According
to sections  and , thousands of immigrants, including Mr. and
Mrs. Katriuk, entered Canada under false or fictitious names.
Item (k) appears to be designed to allow British collaborators to enter
Canada, since this seems to be the only relevant territory which was
not occupied by the Germans.]
 On February 7, 1949, the Associate
Commissioner of Immigration, Overseas Service, advised the Commissioner
In the past
applications have been rejected by the R.C.M.P. without giving reasons
for rejection. In several cases this procedure caused this Department
to communicate with the R.C.M.P. in order to learn the grounds of
rejection. This was necessary because in certain cases we suspected
that the reason for rejection was that the proposed immigrant might
have served with the enemy forces. According to instructions, if
the proposed immigrant has been forced to serve the enemy forces and
could obtain evidence to that effect he was then admissible. To
obviate this situation and in order that the senior officers of this
Branch (the Minister, the Deputy Minister, the Director, Commissioner,
Assistant Commissioner, Commissioner of Overseas Service, Asst.
Commissioner of Overseas Service, the Superintendent of European
Emigration and the Asst. Superintendent of European Emigration) would
know the grounds of rejection, the R.C.M.P. have agreed to include
after the words "Not Clear for Security" the grounds for rejection by
indicating the grounds by a letter (a), (b), (c), (d), etc., whichever
grounds are applicable. These grounds are listed as follows: -
[The grounds which follow are those which appear in the R.C.M.P. memorandum dated November 20, 1948.]
 In a memorandum dated September 16,
1949, the Privy Council"s office informed the Prime Minister of Canada
on the rejection criteria for prospective immigrants. The memorandum
reads as follows:
Rejection of prospective immigrants on
1. At a recent meeting of the Cabinet
you inquired as to the authority for rejecting prospective immigrants
on security grounds.
2. The security screening of
prospective immigrants has been approved by Cabinet and the general
arrangements for conducting the inquiries have been worked out by the
Immigration Branch and the R.C.M. Police in consultation, when
necessary, with the Security Panel. The Panel have on occasions sought
direction from the Cabinet on particular problems that have arisen from
time to time.
3. The objective of the security screening has been interpreted in the following manner:
"To deny admission to any persons who, from
their known history and background, would be unlikely to adapt
themselves to the Canadian way of life and to our democratic form of
4. Under these general principles, the
following categories of persons have been regarded as inadmissible on
(a) Communist, know or strongly suspected.
Communist agitator or suspected Communist Agent.
(b) Member of SS or German Wehrmacht.
Found to bear mark of SS Blood Group (Non Germans).
(c) Member of Nazi Party.
(d) Evasive and untruthful under interrogation.
(e) Failure to produce
recognizable and acceptable documents as to time of entry and residence
(f) False presentation; use of false or fictitious name.
(g) Collaborators presently residing in previously occupied territory.
(h) Member of the Italian Fascist Party or of the Mafia.
(i) Trotskyite or member of other revolutionary organization.
5. The only class covered by a precise
Cabinet direction is that of Communist. On March 5, 1947, it was
agreed that where, as a result of a security investigation, it was
demonstrated that a prospective immigrant was a Communist, admission
should be refused by the Immigration Branch without reason assigned for
such action. From time to time the security problems attendant upon
increased immigration have been considered by the Cabinet Committee on
Immigration or the Cabinet. From the records it is apparent that a good
deal of discussion took place on the question of whether the
Immigration Act should be amended to exclude certain undesirable
classes such as Nazis, Fascists and war criminals, or whether the
problem should be dealt with by administrative means. The decisions
taken were in favour of the latter course.
6. As I think your interest in this
subject stems from present practices in regard to prospective
immigrants from France, I should add that such persons are subjected to
security inquiries as a matter of course, whereas those from the United
Kingdom are not. [Emphasis added]
[We note that all decisions are being
made within the secret confines of the Old Boy's Club, not within
public view via parliament. We also note the favored status of British
 The categories of persons inadmissible
on security grounds which appear in the above memorandum at paragraph 4
thereof, also appear in a top secret memorandum dated June 9,
1950,_from the Deputy Minister to the Minister of Immigration.
 On October 28, 1949, Cabinet issued Directive No. 1413
which dealt with the rejection of immigrants on security grounds. The directive provided as follows:
purpose of this directive is to bring to the attention of all
government departments and agencies concerned the necessity for
withholding information with regard to the rejection of immigrants on
Displaced persons and certain classes
of prospective immigrants desiring to enter Canada are investigated
under established procedures by the R.C.M. Police. Persons in specified
categories (i.e., Communists, members of the Nazi or Fascist Parties or
of any revolutionary organization, "collaborators", and users of false or fictitious names or documents)
are regarded as inadmissible under the Immigration Act and are refused
a visa. As some of the persons so rejected are not aware that their
subversive records are known to security and intelligence agencies,
disclosure of the reasons for their rejection as immigrants tends to
excite suspicion and compromise valuable sources of information.
For these reasons, it is important that, in such cases, no intimation to [sic]
given to the applicant, the relatives or the sponsor that entry had
been refused on security grounds. In some instances, this information
has been passed on to the applicant or the sponsor by persons who,
because of their position, have had access to the facts. This has
resulted in serious embarrassment to the immigration authorities and to
In view of the above, the Cabinet
decided on September 29th, that under no circumstances should the
reason for withholding permission to enter Canada, in the case of
displaced persons and prospective immigrants, be attributed to security
grounds. The only information to be given out in these cases should be
a simple statement, without explanation, that a visa has been refused.
[Repeat: Old Boy's Club.]
 On August 19, 1949, A.J. Desjardins,
Attaché, Visa Section, Paris, in a memorandum addressed to the
Commissioner, Overseas Service, Immigration Branch, discussed the
immigration forms being used at the Canadian Consulate in Paris in
regard to prospective immigrants. In his memorandum, Mr. Desjardins
suggests that it would be preferable if the applicants were "to
complete the form himself, thus avoiding at least some additional work
by our visa officers, ...". To the memorandum is attached a proposed
form with numerous questions and answers. One of the proposed questions
is question number 35 which requires an applicant to provide details
regarding his residences and employments between 1938 and the date of
[There is no evidence that this proposed form was ever utilized.]
[94a] By 1950, Germans were taken off the Canadian immigration prohibited list.
 In an instruction dated February
14, 1950 issued by the Acting Director of the Immigration Branch of the
Department of Citizenship and Immigration, immigration officers are
1. The following categories of immigrants are exempt from security screening: -
(a) British subjects,
citizens of Ireland, and citizens of the Union of South Africa.
(b) Citizens of France born in France and residing in France.
(c) Citizens of the United States of America.
Aliens legally admitted to the United States of
America for permanent residence and residing therein.
Native born citizens of Central and South
American countries residing therein.
2. All other immigrants are subject to security screening. [Emphasis added]
[Once again, British, French and American collaborators and war criminals are exempt.]
[95a] On July 4, 1950, Samuel Bronfman of
the Canadian Jewish Congress sent a long telegram protesting the June
15, 1950 announcement that members of the Galicia Division would be
allowed to immigrate to Canada. On July 7, 1950, a ban on such
immigration was instituted, which, fortunately was lifted on September
25, 1950, despite further vehement protests of Mr. Bronfman.
This incident illustrates the tremendous pressure exerted by the
Holocaust Industry on the Ottawa bureaucracy on immigration issues,
especially when it involves Ukrainians. We have no evidence of any
connection between Mr. Bronfman situated in Montreal and the Soviet
KGB. However, the Jewish community in Montreal has historically been
the locus of Soviet espionage infiltration, as illustrated by the
Lamontagne(?) hearings on the Gouzenko affair and the election of the
Communist candidate, Fred Rose, during the 1940s.
 On August 21, 1950, copies of
immigration form O.S.8 were sent to the heads of Canadian posts abroad
by the Department of External Affairs. The covering letter indicated
I enclose a supply of
Settlement Forms Imm. O.S. 8 to be completed by applicants abroad who
have no relatives or friends in Canada, but who otherwise satisfy the
Visa officers as being desirable immigrants, see paragraph 9 of the
"Administration of new Immigration Regulations Order-in-Council P.C.
2856" enclosed with Consular Document No. 21 of July 4, 1950.
Additional copies of Form Imm. O.S. 8 will be forwarded upon request.
[But the Katriuk's did have friends, the
Rohosky's, who invited them to immigrate to Canada. So form O.S.8 would
not be applicable to them.]
 This form does not specifically
request an applicant to provide details of either his residences or
employments during the war years. However, question 36 requires the
applicant to provide details on the longest job he has had in the last
ten years and question 37 requests the applicant to indicate how
many jobs he has had in the last ten years.
 In a memorandum dated November 6,
1950, to the Officer i/c Special Branch, Headquarters, R.C.M.P. in
Ottawa, Major Wright of the London office reported to his superiors
with respect to his visit to Paris in October 1950. The relevant points
of Major Wright"s report are as follows. He met with Sergeant
Constable Colville and the immigration officer in charge, Mr. Cormier,
and discussed with them the possibility of posting an additional man to
the Paris office. Major Wright was informed that the work in Paris was
increasing to such an extent that Sergeant Colville did not believe
that he would be able to cope without further assistance. During the
meeting, Sergeant Colville complained that it was extremely difficult
to obtain complete information from French officials about criminal
records. Mr. Cormier informed Major Wright that having a second person
to help Sergeant Colville "would enable personal interviews of all
immigrants to be made". In his memorandum, Major Wright goes on to
explain what follows:
6. On the 26th October I had a
lengthy interview with Mr. Cormier and Colville. Relations between them
appeared to be quite satisfactory. Mr. Cormier officially made two
requests. Firstly, that a second man be stationed at Paris to assist
Colville. This would enable personal interviews of all immigrants to be
made. The great majority of those going to Canada were non-French and
required personal screening as much or more than those in the D.P.
Camps of Germany, as the foreigners in France were mainly newcomers
concerning whom very little was known. Secondly, that the office system
inaugurated by Cpl. De Miffonis - with the co-operation of Mr.
Desjardins (Mr. Cormier"s predecessor) be simplified. Colville was
endeavouring to continue the very thorough but to some extent
unnecessary office and filing system inaugurated by de Miffonis which
created too much work for both Departments, Mr. Cormier"s and
7. Mr. Cormier advised that in 1951 it
was anticipated that approximately 6,000 visas would be issued, and for
that number to be issued, allowing for rejections etc. probably would
mean some 10,000 examinations. Obviously if all prospective Immigrants
were to be personally examined by Security, Colville would require
8. Later, after interviewing Colville
and going into his filing system, with a view to eliminating work, I
instructed him to discontinue the long Questionnaire Form at present in
use, photographs, etc. and other forms and in place thereof to use the
London "Green Form", to be compiled direct from Immigration Files and
this to constitute his permanent record for each case. This should
simplify the office work very considerably.
9. Colville has not been granted leave
of absence since terminating his leave in December 1949. If he is to be
stationed permanently at Paris, I would request instructions if the
leave arrangements made when he was engaged for service in Germany viz,
10 days every three months are still to apply.
[There is no evidence that another
security officer was ever sent to Paris. This section supports the
Katriuk's contention that they were never interviewed by a security
10. I recommend strongly that an
additional Security Officer be posted to Paris as soon as possible, and
would request your instructions hereon, please14
 On January 2, 1951, by way of a
memorandum, the Director of the Immigration Branch informed the
Undersecretary of State for External Affairs that immigration form
O.S.8 had been revised and that all copies of the former form O.S.8
should be destroyed. As in the previous O.S.8 form, there are no
questions which deal specifically with an applicant"s residences and
employments during the war years. The form does contain, however, the
two following questions:
27. Give the same details on the longest job you have had in the last ten years.
Donnez les mêmes détails sur l"emploi que vous avez occupé le plus longtemps au cours des dix dernières années:
28. How many jobs have you had in the last ten years?
Combien d"emplois avez-vous eus au cours des dix dernières années?
[As we have noted above, this form was
presumably not applicable to Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk. Secondly, there is
no evidence whatsoever that this form was ever utilized in Paris in
1951 on any immigrant, let alone Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk. Thirdly, we have
shown below that even if the above questions had been asked of Mr. and
Mrs. Katriuk by the employee who filled out their immigration forms,
their correct answers would not have resulted in rejection of their
 On January 8, 1951, Mr. Cormier, the
visa officer in charge in Paris, wrote as follows to the Director,
Department of Citizenship and Immigration, regarding revised form OS-8:
Acknowledging receipt of your
communication of 2nd January, we are very glad that the prescribed
questionnaire has been simplified.
For Stage "B" purposes15
we require to know the maiden name of the wife and the history of
movements of applicant for visa, and as regards persons not born in
France, the date of their arrival into this country. In connection with
applicant"s history, the "Former addresses and other countries of
residence" under item 2 of Part I of O.S.8, is not considered
sufficient by our Stage "B" officer.
So far as the maiden name of the wife
is concerned, we are preparing a stamp reading "Wife"s maiden name -
Nom de jeune fille de l"épouse" to be placed under Item 14 of the new
type of O.S.8, for the time being. We will also attach to the
questionnaire to be filled a chit as per sample herewith.
 The questionnaire attached to Mr. Cormier"s memorandum is as follows:
(Veuillez remplir ce feuillet séparément)
Renseignements sur vos résidences et emplois antérieurs depuis 1939
Date Employeur Genre d"emploi Votre résidence
............... ............................ ................................................................
............... ............................ ................................................................
............... ............................ ................................................................
............... ............................ ................................................................
............... ............................ ................................................................
............... ............................ ................................................................
............... ............................ ................................................................
............... ............................ ................................................................
Si vous n"êtes pas né en France, indiquez le lieu et la date
de votre entrée en ce pays:
[Since there is no evidence whatsoever
that this ad hoc questionnaire was ever utilized, it is rather amusing
that Judge Nadon reproduces 8 blank lines in an effort to convince the
reader of its legitimacy. Furthermore, the legality of an employee
arbitrarily making up his own questionnaire is rather dubious.
On page 200 of the Deschenes Commission Report, we find the following:
Form 55, in use until the end of 1950, contained no question respecting the wartime activities of the applicant.
The original OS.8 form inquired about the jobs of the applicant during
the previous 10 years: this might have led to the disclosure of
military activities, though nothing was asked expressly on the subject.
The 1951 revision of Form OS.8 did not inquire any further.]
 On February 4, 1951, Directive No. 69
dated December 15, 1950, was amended . Page 5 of the amendment
provides, in part, as follows:
9. Cases for which Visa Officers may not grant visas without prior reference to Canada. (Refers to Part "A" of this Directive, paragraph 5, Other Suitable and Desirable Immigrants).
Two copies of Part I and Part II of Form O.S. 8 will be completed for distribution as follows:
i) The first copy
will remain in the Visa Office to be used for stage "B", if required,
and for subsequent use as office record of visa granted or refused.
ii) The second copy will be forwarded, by air mail,
to the District Superintendent or Inspector-in-Charge of the
authorizing port or office (see Para. 14) in whose area the prospective
immigrant wishes to locate. If an area of establishment or settlement
is not chosen by the immigrant and is not determined by the Visa
Officer, this copy will be forwarded by air mail to the Superintendent, Settlement Division, at Immigration Branch Headquarters, Ottawa.
the Visa Officer considers that reference to the Department of Labour
for placement is required, the fact will be indicated on the Form O.S.
8, (see Para. 16(f)(v)) and the second copy will be forwarded by air mail, to the Superintendent, Settlement Division.
 On February 7, 1951, the Director of
the Immigration Branch in Ottawa sent a memorandum to the Deputy
Minister regarding security screening. The memorandum reads as follows:
The introduction of P.C. 2856,
designed to stimulate immigration to Canada, is bringing about the
desired results insofar as the development of interest in Canada is
Available figures show that there was
an 8% increase in November, 1950, over the corresponding month in 1949.
In December, 1950, the increase over December, 1949, amounted to 36.7%.
In addition, statistics furnished by Immigration Visa Officers
establish that there has been a great increase in the number of
enquiries from potential immigrants. There is every indication that
there will be a marked increase in immigration, provided that we take
advantage of present interest - developed through the widening of
admissible classes, publicity, etc., - by impeding the flow as little
[Note: impede the flow as little as possible.]
We have taken the necessary steps to
streamline our procedure through such means as delegation of authority
to Visa officers to process, immediately, persons who are suitable and
desirable immigrants with good prospect of becoming established in
Canada. Provided the only delay is that occasioned by the necessity for
the immigrant to undergo a medical and civil examination, we hope to
take full advantage of the interest shown by the intending immigrant.
[Note: delegate authority to visa officers.]
Unfortunately, the present security
procedure has hindered and, as presently constituted, will continue to
hinder the implementation of the immigration programme. To understand
some of the reasons why this is so and to explore ways and means of
obviating this situation, the security procedure currently in effect is
reviewed briefly in the following paragraphs.
1. At the present time, all immigrants
are security screened except British subjects, citizens of Ireland,
citizens of the United States, legal and permanent residents of the
United States and native-born citizens of Central and South American
countries residing therein.
[Note: ubermenschen status of British and Americans.]
2. Security screening, at points
outside Europe, may be carried out by the Visa officers through local
contacts except in those cases which are referred directly by the
Immigration Branch to the R.C.M..P. Headquarters in Ottawa for full
security screening. In these excepted cases, it is understood that
R.C.M.P. Headquarters obtain the clearance through the Security Office
3. In Europe, where our main concern
lies, security screening is carried out primarily by Security officers
where attached to our Visa offices. Their screening procedure may be
broken down into two general classifications :
Personal interrogation of the prospective
Reference to local police, British authorities,
local contacts, and/or London Security Office for information as to the
status of the intending immigrant.
The speed with which an immigrant is
screened for security, under the method outlined in (b) naturally
depends on the length of time it takes the various organizations to
reply. A normal delay is from 4 to 7 weeks, although in some cases, it
is considerably longer.
4. In Germany and Austria, intending
immigrants are screened primarily by personal interrogation, although
in some cases, reference to local contacts, London, etc., may be
5. In Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, France,
and Italy, Security officers generally rely on the reference to local
police, British authorities, local contacts or to London when necessary.
6. In Greece, Switzerland and Denmark
where no Security officers are located, Visa officers develop local
contacts and carry out the same procedure as do Security officers in
the other European countries.
7. In the United Kingdom we have, in
essence, the focal point of all security screening. The London Security
Section is used as the final source of reference when other methods -
local police, etc., - either fail to produce the required information
or are not considered sufficiently reliable in specific cases under
[London: the seat of Philby, Burgess, Maclean, Blunt et al.]
In addition, London not only clears
all aliens residing in the United Kingdom who apply for admission to
Canada, but also processes applications referred from R.C.M.P.
Headquarters. London, therefore, deals with :
(a) Aliens in the United Kingdom;
(b) referrals by
Security officers and Visa officers in Europe for a further check;
referrals by R.C.M.P. Headquarters for
information on aliens residing at any point in the world outside of
The London Security Section processes
only 35 cases per day, referred from points outside the United Kingdom,
and at the present they are 7 weeks behind. This quota is fixed by the
British authorities whose facilities are being used. In London, then,
with enquiries feeding in from many sources, a backlog is building up
which, as the immigration programme becomes intensified, will be even
greater, with most serious effects.
[Note: 7 weeks behind and the problem is sure to get worse.]
Any consideration of ways and means of
alleviating this problem, naturally, would revert to the question of
additional staff. Undoubtedly, the allocation of additional Security
officers to the Visa offices on the Continent would improve the
situation. However, this antidote in itself, if the present screening
procedure remains in effect will not help the overall picture. More
Security officers would merely mean a greater number of references to
local police, British authorities, London, etc., whose rate of
processing is now inadequate to meet our needs. In other words,
additional Security officers without changes in procedure will hardly
bring about the desired result.
[Note: changes in procedures required.]
Personal interrogations (if additional
Security officers were appointed) and fewer references to other sources
by Security officers might be a partial answer to the problem.
Certainly, the London Security Office, if relieved of the referrals
from the Security officers on the Continent, might improve its present
record in dealing with enquiries from other points throughout the
world. For instance, a delay of one year is not uncommon in obtaining
security clearance through London by R.C.M.P. Headquarters on a person
residing in South America.
Then too, consideration of the
principles involved in security screening might be justified, when it
is considered that since security screening was instituted,
approximately 220,000 immigrants who required security screening have
come forward and of the total number examined only 4,146 were rejected
on security grounds. Of the 4,146 rejected, undoubtedly a fairly large
proportion might now be considered for admission since the reasons for
rejection no longer exist, e.g., service in the German Army is, in
itself, no longer a clause for rejection.
[Note: service in German Army is no longer a cause for rejection.]
On the whole, it is felt that some
streamlining of the present security procedure should be considered as
an interim measure, to implement to the fullest degree possible the
present immigration programme. While a revision of security procedure
is desirable immediately, as a stop-gap measure, to take advantage of
the extremely great current interest in immigration, a review of the
principles of security screening should be instituted as soon as
[The problems expressed in this memo illustrate the impossible task assigned to the overseas immigration personnel.]
 On May 23, 1951, Laval Fortier16
wrote to the Secretary of the Security Panel in the following terms:
I have your letter of May 18th, with reference to paragraph 10(3) of the minutes of the 36th meeting of the Security Panel. I
would recommend the following changes in the present policy affecting
the categories of rejection of certain classes of immigrants:
Category "B" - Waffen S.S. (non Germans) present blanket clause for rejection.
is felt that some relaxation should be given to classes involving
compassionate grounds, age or circumstances surrounding enlistment.
Recommended that service in the Waffen S.S., in itself, be no longer a
cause for rejection.
Category "G" - Black Market Racketeer, present blanket clause for rejection.
Black Market activities, in itself, be not a cause for rejection,
except for those who were professional racketeers.
Category "K" - Collaborators, present blanket cause for rejection.
collaboration, in itself, be not a cause for rejection, except for
those whose crimes are such that they are not desirable.
Category "L" - Member of the Italian Fascist Party or of the Mafia, present blanket cause for rejection.
Category "C" - Member of the Nazi Party, is not now considered, in
itself, a cause for rejection, recommend same consideration be given
Italian Fascist Party, Member of Mafia to remain as at present.
[Note: member of Nazi Party is not a cause for rejection.
Recommend that collaboration and member of Italian Fascist Party not be a cause for rejection.]
 On July 5, 1951, the Security Panel
met and a discussion took place of proposed changes to the security
screening criteria. A memorandum of the discussion dated July 6, 1951,
reads as follows:
At a meeting of
the Security Panel held on July 5th, at which the writer and Mr.
Hickman accompanied the Deputy Minister, there was discussed the
Immigration Branch Security Screening Directive of February 14th, 1950,
and some changes were recommended.
Discussion on the categories introduced by the Mounted Police resulted in recommendations as follows: -
CATEGORY "B" -
Non-German members Waffen S.S. found to bear mark of S.S. Blood Group were to be considered "Not Clear".
Non-German members Waffen S.S. who
joined this Organization prior to January 1st, 1943, to be considered
Non-German members Waffen S.S. who
voluntarily enlisted subsequent to January 1st, 1943, to be considered
Non-German members Waffen S.S., who
were conscripted or forced to enlist subsequent January 1st, 1943,
cases to be reviewed on their merits.
CATEGORIES "D", "E", "F" and "G"
R.C.M.P. to follow present procedure of advising Visa Officers.
The remaining Categories to be dealt with under the present procedure.
It was suggested that External Affairs
and the R.C.M.P. prepare a memorandum dealing with the categories as a
[105a] Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk landed in Quebec City on August 14, 1951. Subsequent discussion is of academic interest only.
 On December 11, 1951, George B.
McClellan, Superintendent, Officer i/c Special Branch, wrote to Colonel
Laval Fortier with respect to collaborators. Mr. McClellan informed
Colonel Fortier as follows:
I have for reply your letter to the Commissioner, dated November 29, 1951, regarding collaborators.
2. Your request for further
particulars regarding collaborators raises a rather difficult question,
as at the present time our Security Officers are very fully occupied in
processing visa applicants, and, if they are required to conduct field
investigations on collaborators, unless we considerably strengthen our
staff overseas, the balance of interrogation must of necessity suffer.
3. As you know, it has been the
policy, where any doubt exists, to resolve that doubt in the favour of
Canada, and as our sources of information must of necessity be very
meagre, it is necessary to develop as much information as possible
during personal interviews. It would require a great deal of field work
to produce positive evidence, and the production of such evidence
would, in most cases, be impossible.
4. It would, perhaps, be desirable to
discuss this matter with Inspector Hall who handles this work. If you
would call him at 7602, he will call on you at your convenience.
 In a memorandum to the Security Panel
prepared by its secretary P.M. Dwyer, dated April 30, 1952, the Panel
was asked to consider possible changes to the screening criteria and,
in particular, with respect to collaborators. The memorandum reads, in
part, as follows:
Immigration Security Policy -
Nazis, Fascists and Collaborators
1. The application of Canadian
immigration security policy to former members of Nazi organizations,
Fascists and collaborators has for some time been under discussion by
members of the Panel. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration and
the RCM Police have asked that the question of collaboration be
discussed by the Panel. An examination of present immigration security
police shows that a similar consideration of membership in Nazi and
Fascist organizations would also be desirable.
10. The Department of External
Affairs, at the request of members of the Panel, has consulted a number
of its European missions and asked to what degree immigration
restrictions should be applied against former collaborators in German
occupied countries. Present immigration security policy prohibits the
immigration of collaborators, but cases have so far been dealt with on
their individual merits or demerits.
11. The consensus of opinion of
missions consulted in that while we should continue to enforce
restrictions against those guilty of major crimes, collaboration should
now be ignored except where a clear and present danger to Canada or
Canadian institutions is involved. Our representatives add that where a
prison sentence for collaboration has been served, the slate should be
regarded as wiped clean. The following are listed as major
convicted of fighting against, or engaging in activities harmful to the
safety and well-being of the Allied forces;
convicted of implication in the taking of life, or engaging in
activities connected with forced labour and concentration camps;
(c) Those who
were employed by German police or security organizations and who acted
as informers against loyal citizens and resistance groups;
(d) Those charged and found guilty of treason.
12. However, the RCM Police incline to
the view that collaboration itself does involve a danger to Canada and
Canadian institutions, because they believe that a person who has been
disloyal to his country of birth may, if the occasion arises, be
equally or more disloyal to a country of adoption. The RCM Police would
therefore be reluctant to accept any relaxation of restrictions at
present imposed on former collaborators.
[We find it intriguing that the RCMP
expressed such great concern about collaborators, who posed absolutely
no threat to Canada, but do not seem to be concerned about KGB agents
being smuggled into Canada. Perhaps the KGB mole and his accomplices
were hard at work performing their duties.]
13. The Panel may wish to bear in mind
that collaboration sometimes resulted only after intolerable pressures
had been applied by the Germans, and may wish to make some provision
for cases of this kind.
14. The Panel is asked to consider this problem and make a fifth recommendation.
 On May 15, 1952, the Security Panel met and discussed, inter alia,
the proposals suggested in the April 30, 1952 memorandum. After due
consideration, the Panel agreed that the following changes were in
order. The changes agreed to by the Panel appear in paragraph 5 of the
minutes of the meeting:
5. The Panel then considered the paper in detail, made a number of emendations [sic] after discussion, and agreed that the following persons should be refused entry into Canada as immigrants:
members of the S.S. the Sicherheitsdienst, the Abwehr, the Gestapo, and
any former member of the Nazi party who, under Allied Control Council
Directive No. 38 of 12th October 1946, was classified as a Major
Offender or Offender of who, on the evidence before a Security Officer
is in his opinion within either of these categories. Particular care
should be taken to exclude persons who were responsible for brutalities
in concentration or labour camps.
(c) Former collaborators who should be excluded on grounds of moral turpitude, except minor collaborators whose actions resulted from coercion.
[It is ironic that the Old Boy's Club would talk about moral turpitude.]
 Pursuant to paragraph 38(c) of the Immigration Act, R.S. 1927, c. 93, (the "Immigration Act, 1927")
the Governor in Council was given wide discretion to prohibit or limit,
by way of proclamation or by order in council, the entry into Canada of
38. The Governor in Council may, by proclamation or order whenever he deems it necessary or expedient,
(c) prohibit or limit in number
for a stated period or permanently the landing in Canada, or the
landing at any specified port or ports of entry in Canada, of
immigrants belonging to any nationality or race or of immigrants of any
specified class or occupation, by reason of any economic, industrial or
other condition temporarily existing in Canada, or because such
immigrants are deemed undesirable having regard to the climatic,
industrial, social, educational, labour or other conditions or
requirements of Canada or because such immigrants are deemed
undesirable owing to their peculiar customs, habits, modes of life and
methods of holding property, and because of their probable inability to
become readily assimilated or to assume the duties and responsibilities
of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after their entry.
[The white man's burden of the British Empire.]
 In furtherance of the objective stated in paragraph 38(c) of the Immigration Act, 1927,
order in council P.C. 1950-2856, S.O.R./50-232, C. Gaz. 1950.II.765,
was passed in June of 1950. This order in council, entitled Immigration Act: Prohibiting the landing in Canada of immigrants with certain exceptions,
prohibited the landing in Canada of immigrants of all classes and
occupations, save for the exceptions provided in the order. Paragraphs
4(a) and (b) read as follows:
4. A person who satisfies the Minister, whose decision shall be final, that: -
he is a suitable immigrant having regard to the
climatic, social, educational, industrial, labour, or other conditions
or requirements of Canada; and
(b) is not undesirable owing to
his peculiar customs, habits, modes of life, methods of holding
property, or because of his probable inability to become readily
adapted and integrated into the life of a Canadian community and to
assume the duties of Canada citizenship within a reasonable time after
[We note that, based on these criteria, both Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk are admirably qualified as immigrants to Canada.]
 In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Dueck,
(21 December 1998), Ottawa: F.C.T.D., T-938-95 [unreported], my
colleague Mr. Justice Noël comes to the conclusion that, until the
enactment of order in council P.C. 1950-2856, there was no authority
under the Immigration Act, 1927 and the orders in council
enacted thereunder, to refuse entry into Canada of immigrants on
security grounds. I agree with the view taken by Noël J.. However, on
August 14, 1951, when Mr. Katriuk was landed in Canada, there was
clearly a legal basis to refuse entry to immigrants who did not meet
the security requirements.
[We submit that in 1951 there was no legal basis for the RCMP to carry on security screening in Europe.]
[In sections  to  below, the
six expert witnesses for Anne McLellan present a picture of a very
tightly controlled and efficiently run immigration process. Accounts by
immigrants and other ex-immigration officers paint a very different
picture of chaos, bewilderment, confusion, overwork, indifference and
apathy. The problems were overwhelming: they were insufficiently
trained; there was continual conflict between immigration quotas and
security screening; working through interpreters was both time
consuming and confusing. The theoretical planning by the bureaucrats in
Ottawa was completely at odds with the realities on the ground. To put
it bluntly, they were faced with an impossible task and muddled through
as best they could.]
RCMP SECURITY AND VISA CONTROL OFFICERS
[William H. Kelly, Deputy Commissioner of
the RCMP, was in charge of security control for the whole of Europe
from 1951 to 1954. He was based in London, the seat of Britain's
Security and Secret Intelligence Services MI5 and MI6 who presumably
supplied security screening information on prospective immigrants to
Canada. The time period in question corresponds exactly to the time
when British intelligence was completely infiltrated by KGB spies like
Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean and Anthony Blunt. Under their
influence one may rest assured that Ukrainian Nationalists would be
painted as war criminals, collaborators and every negative description
under the sun. Conversely, KGB agents specifically trained to
infiltrate Canadian institutions would be allowed to slip into the
British, American and French-controlled zones of Germany and be cleared
to immigrate to Canada.
 I now turn to the process by
which prospective immigrants were screened for security by the R.C.M.P.
in light of the criteria set out in the above memoranda. The Minister
called a number of former R.C.M.P. officers to testify on this point.
William H. Kelly, a former Deputy Commissioner of the R.C.M.P.,
explained his role in London between 1951 and 1954. While there, Mr.
Kelly was in charge of security control for the whole of Europe. A
number of countries, including France, were, at that time, under the
jurisdiction of the London office. One of Mr. Kelly"s duties was to
visit the countries under his jurisdiction and to ensure that files
were reasonably handled. He, on occasion, would sit on interviews
conducted by security officers. He would also be asked to make rulings
in borderline cases. When shown the memorandum dated September 16,
1949, setting out the list of inadmissible categories on security
grounds, Mr. Kelly stated that he had never seen this document but,
when referred to paragraph 4 thereof, stated that the R.C.M.P. worked
on the basis of the criteria set out in that paragraph. He indicated
that his point of reference was Cabinet Directive No. 14. With respect
to paragraph 4(g) of the September 16, 1949 memo entitled
"collaborators presently residing in previously occupied territory",
Mr. Kelly testified that, as far as he was concerned,
"collaboration" necessarily meant exclusion. Mr. Kelly stated that it
was only in May of 1952 that the exclusion of collaborators was changed
to allow some flexibility in that "minor collaborators" would not be
excluded where their actions "resulted from coercion"17
Mr. Kelly explained that the same criteria was being applied by the
R.C.M.P. throughout Europe and that it was his responsibility to ensure
that that was taking place. He explained that security screening was
one step in a three step immigration process.
It was a time when all attempts (under the control of British
intelligence) by Stepan Bandera to send his people to make contact with
the UPA fighting for independence in Ukraine ended in disaster.
In his book on MI5 and MI6 (with the title noted above), R.G. Grant
describes British intelligence of that time in the following words:
"The old hands in the secret service struck Trevor-Roper as 'by and
large pretty stupid and some of them very stupid'. Kim Philby found it
hard to believe that the puny organization he had joined was really the
British secret service at all: 'It seemed that somewhere lurking in
deep shadow, there must be another service, really secret and really
powerful...But it soon became clear that such was not the case. It was
the death of an illusion.'
Sinclair's successor as head of MI6, Colonel Stewart Menzies, was cast
in the traditional mould of the service. He was a man of no great
intellect but exceptionally good social connections - he did not
discourage the rumour that he was an illegitimate son of Edward VII,
and his mother was lady-in-waiting at Court. He had a passion for fox
hunting and a taste for the smartest London clubs. In short, he was an
unlikely person to lead a renaissance of MI6."
The rot within the elite British Old Boy's Club obviously spread to
Canada as the existence of extensive Soviet espionage rings were
revealed by Igor Gouzenko in 1945. Despite a cosmetic attempt to find
the spies, John Sawatsky, in his several books, has written
convincingly that a mole still exists within the RCMP to the present
One final note from the Deschenes Commission Report. On page 219 of his
Report, Justice Jules Deschenes has the following comments on the
testimony of William H. Kelly, 74, retired Deputy Commissioner:
On the RCMP side, Mr. Kelly was posted in London, England in 1961
where, in his own words, he "...became the officer in charge of visa
controls, as we called it, and the liaison officer between the RCMP and
all police organizations, intelligence organizations and security
organizations, in what we now know as Western Europe." As such, he had
nothing to do personally with the actual screening process. His
evidence cannot help us here.
On pages 221-222, we read:
I am not sure whether they interviewed every person or whether they
just vetted the application. ... If I am getting your question
correctly, I would say that Immigration was more concerned with numbers
then they were with security. Having said that, perhaps I should
qualify it. Perhaps they were less concerned with security because they
knew the RCMP was dealing with it, but they certainly quarrelled with
us often enough because we were not producing results quickly enough,
and, of course, the results that we were producing depended upon the
support and co-operation of our sources.]
 Security screening was conducted
on the basis of information provided by the immigrant in his
application form and, in particular, information providing his
residences and employments between 1938 and the date of his
application. Security screening involved paper screening with
intelligence organizations of the countries where the applicant had
indicated he had been and with intelligence organizations from the
United Kingdom and the United States which might be in a position to
provide information regarding the applicant. Following the paper
screening, there would be a personal interview during which the
immigrant would be questioned by a security officer regarding his
identity and history. Mr. Kelly conceded that the R.C.M.P."s security
screening was not very effective since it was difficult, if not
impossible, for the security officer to ascertain whether an applicant
was telling the truth. It was only when the officer could discover
something through the intelligence network that an applicant would be
refused entry into Canada. Finally, Mr. Kelly emphasized that
collaboration with the Germans to any degree meant rejection. In
cross-examination, Mr. Kelly stated that the main security concern was
Communist infiltration which rose dramatically after the Gouzenko
affair in 1945.
 Another R.C.M.P. officer called
by the Minister was Donald Graham Cobb. Mr. Cobb spent three and
one half years in Paris between 1954 and 1958 as a visa control officer
(which, in effect, meant security officer) and was then posted to Rome
and Cologne between 1958 and 1962. He testified that in Paris he worked
under the tutelage of senior officers namely, Percy Colville, a retired
British police officer, and Sergeant Henri Chénier. He indicated that
the first order of business in screening an applicant was to establish
the person"s identity. If there was any doubt, the applicant would be
asked to provide documents to verify his identity. The second order of
business was to obtain information from the applicant regarding his
activities during the war. Finally, Mr. Cobb explained that the
security officer would attempt to obtain information regarding the
applicant"s political history. Mr. Cobb stated that what he did between
1954 and 1958 was simply a continuation of what the Paris office had
been doing in the past. He indicated that the rejection criteria which
appears in the memorandum of September 16, 1949 was the criteria
that he applied in dealing with applicants. Mr. Cobb made it clear that
"they were not focussing on the small fry". He explained that there was
a group of four to five people working together in the Paris office who
consulted with each other and with the London office. Mr. Cobb
explained that French citizens were screened like all other applicants.
However, contrary to non-French applicants, French citizens were not
interviewed. In cross-examination, Mr. Cobb stated that a great
majority of people who applied through the French office were
non-French. He indicated that he believed he had processed
approximately 3,000 cases during his years in Paris. The rejection
rate, according to Mr. Cobb, was probably five percent of all cases. In
redirect, Mr. Cobb indicated that a non-French applicant who had
obtained a medal from the French resistance would nonetheless have been
 The Minister also called Donald
D. Cliffe who had been posted to Italy in March 1951 where he
spent three years. He returned to Canada in September 1954 for two
months and was then sent to Stockholm and Helsinki for two and one half
years. In 1957, he was sent to Switzerland until the summer of 1958.
Mr. Cliffe explained that he was the "control" officer and worked with
a medical doctor and a visa officer. He explained the visa control
process as follows. Applications would be received by the visa officer
who would then pass the file on to the security officer. The security
officer would attempt to gather information regarding the applicant"s
activities from 1938 onwards and would attempt to obtain data from
various intelligence networks. The security officer would then conduct
interviews with the applicants. He referred to this process as "stage
B". He testified that, if the security officer informed the visa
officer that the applicant did not pass security, it was the end of the
matter. He also stated that, as part of the process, an applicant would
be seen and examined by a medical officer. He stated that the London
office had overall responsibility for the screening process and that
the rejection criteria which appears in the memorandum of September 16,
1949 was the criteria that he based his decision on in deciding whether
or not an applicant should be rejected. He made it clear that all
collaborators were to be rejected and that he acted accordingly. He
testified that auxiliary police in Ukraine and in the Baltic States
were, as far as he was concerned, collaborators and should have been
rejected. In cross-examination, Mr. Cliffe explained that it was
possible for him and other security officers to exercise some
discretion in dealing with applicants. He gave as an example the case
of an Italian uneducated labourer who would have joined the Italian
Fascist Party because it was the thing to do but, in fact, had not
participated in any of the party"s activities. In such a case, Mr.
Cliffe stated that he would probably not have rejected such an
[It is our understanding, that until 1959
the RCMP Act did not grant the RCMP authority to undertake security
screening abroad. Thus, we question the legality of any security
screening carried out by RCMP officers Kelly, Cobb and Cliffe.
 The Minister also called Lucien
Roger St-Vincent who joined the immigration services in November 1947.
In 1948, he was posted to Germany as a visa officer. While in Germany,
he worked with a doctor and a security officer and they travelled
together to various refugee camps, including camps in Austria. He
stated that the applicant"s file was always brought to the security
officer and then to the medical officer. He made it clear that he would
never overrule a security officer"s decision. He explained that an
applicant"s war time activities fell under the responsibility of the
security officer and that evasive applicants were always sent to the
security officer. In 1951, Mr. St-Vincent returned to Montreal for five
years where he was a port of entry officer. By "port of entry", Mr.
St-Vincent meant that he would, on occasion, be called upon to attend
on ships which arrived in Montreal with sometimes 600 to 900 immigrants
on board. He explained that immigrants were landed in Canada upon their
arrival in the country and that the port of entry officer would verify,
amongst other things, where the immigrants had boarded the ship in
Europe. He explained that port of entry officers would board a ship
upon its arrival in Quebec City or Montreal and conduct an examination
of every immigrant on board that ship. This would take approximately
four to five hours. Mr. St-Vincent explained that the immigrant"s
visa was evidence of his admissibility to Canada but that, in the end,
landing in Canada was the decision of the landing officer at the port
[We note that the numbers quoted
correspond to interview times of 16 to 30 seconds per person if there
is only one landing officer.]
 Walter Gunn was also called by
the Minister. He joined the immigration services of Canada in 1946 as
an immigration officer in the Montreal downtown office. From 1950 to
1954, Mr. Gunn was a port of entry officer and explained that teams of
six to twelve officers would go on board ships arriving in Montreal and
Quebec City. He explained that the duty of a port of entry officer was
to enforce the Immigraction Act and Regulations so as to
exclude from Canada inadmissible persons. He explained that, until the
end of 1951, port of entry officers used a particular form, namely the
Canadian Government Return Form ("C.G.R."). Mr. Gunn explained that the
C.G.R. would be filled out during the voyage by the ship"s purser.
Presumably, the ship"s purser would accomplish this task while speaking
to the immigrants onboard and verifying their documents. Upon the
ship"s arrival in Canada, the port of entry officers would review the
information appearing in the C.G.R. with the immigrants to verify
whether that information was accurate.
[The interview times increase to 96
seconds to 6 minutes per person. Obviously, these procedures were just
an administrative formality.]
[Most people equate nationality with
ethnicity. In 1951, Mr. Katriuk stated he was Ukrainian. However, in
1958 under the tutelage of his lawyer, Mr. Katriuk responded in a more
legalistically correct manner.]
 I should point out that the C.G.R. for the ship NELLY
which sailed from Le Havre on August 6, 1951 and arrived in Quebec
City on August 14, 1951, was adduced in evidence. It contains entries
in the name of Nicolas and Maria Schpirka. The form clearly shows that
the Schpirkas were landed by an immigration officer [NAME?]
in Quebec City on August 14, 1951. I should also point out that the
form indicates that Mr. Katriuk declared that he was born in Mamaieski18
Ukraine. The form also shows that Mr. Katriuk declared that his
nationality was Ukrainian. In his application for Canadian citizenship,
however, the respondent declared that he was born in Luzhany, Romania,
and that his nationality was Romanian.
 From 1954 to 1957, Mr. Gunn was
posted to Brussels where he was a visa officer. He explained that there
were two doctors, one security officer and three visa officers employed
in the Brussels office. Mr. Gunn stated that he issued over 4,000
visas during his three years in Brussels.
[Obviously, if the visa officers spent 15
to 20 minutes per person, the security officer would only have 5 to 7
minutes per person. Since an interpreter would have to be used, this
would barely be enough time to exchange greetings and names.]
 In her rebuttal evidence, the
Minister called Alex Trupp who joined the R.C.M.P. in 1947 at the age
of twenty. Mr. Trupp was posted to Germany from 1953 to 1956 as a visa
control officer. He testified that, while there, they (he and two other
"seasoned" officers) were looking for Gestapo, S.S. criminals,
communists and collaborators.
3.5.3 DEFENSE TESTIMONY
 I will now address the evidence
submitted by Mr. Katriuk regarding obtaining his visa through the Paris
office in 1951. Mr. Katriuk and his wife applied for visas in the names
of Vladimir and Maria Schpirka. They applied for their visas under
false names. As I have already indicated, Mr. Katriuk's position is
that he was never asked, when he applied to come to Canada, what he did
during the war years. He also testified that he was not interviewed. He
indicated that a form had been filled out by an employee at the
Consulate who had taken information from his identity card. Finally, as
no one asked him about his activities during the War, Mr. Katriuk
stated that he did not volunteer the information.
 I now turn to the evidence of
Mrs. Katriuk. When the Schpirkas applied to come to Canada in 1951,
Mrs. Schpirka knew that her husband"s real name was Katriuk. She
testified that they attended the Canadian Consulate on three occasions.
The first time, they obtained information with regard to what had to be
done. The second time, they brought their documents and the third time,
they saw a doctor who took chest x-rays. She explained that an employee
of the Consulate asked questions which they answered and that the
employee filled out a form on their behalf. Although she could not
specifically remember, Mrs. Katriuk, in cross-examination, conceded
that she and her husband must have signed the form. Mrs. Katriuk did
not remember being asked any questions regarding her residences and
employments since 1938.
[It is not clear whether Judge Nadon feels that Mrs. Katriuk should be denaturalized and deported.]
 Mr. Katriuk called two former
Ukrainian colleagues of Battalion 118 to testify on his behalf. The
first witness was Ivan Serbyn. Mr. Serbyn was born in 1919 in Bukovina,
Romania. He, like Mr. Katriuk, left Bukovina in 1941 to go to Kyiv.
Mr. Serbyn was part of a group of men who, in 1944, left their
battalion to join the FFI. Mr. Serbyn also refused to return to Russia
and, as a result, enrolled in the FFL for a period of three years. As a
member of the FFL, he was sent to Algeria where he underwent training
in preparation for Indochina. While in Algeria, a Soviet Reconnaissance
Group asked him to return to Russia and the FFL suggested that he
change his name and go to Indochina. He decided to return to the
Ukraine. The Russians put him on a ship bound for Europe and, when he
arrived in the Russian zone of Germany, he left and made his way to
Paris. In Paris, he obtained a temporary permit of three months which,
in due course, was extended to ten years. He then went into business
with Mr. Katriuk. Mr. Serbyn, like Mr. Katriuk, was a butcher.
 In the spring of 1951, after
receiving a letter of invitation from a M. Bannet, a Ukrainian who had
immigrated to Canada around 1949, Mr. Serbyn attended the Canadian
Consulate in Paris to inquire about his chances of being admitted as a
permanent resident. Mr. Serbyn testified that he was informed by
someone at the Consulate that, if he could pass the medical
examinations and demonstrate that he owed no taxes to the French
government, he should have no difficulty. Within a short period of
time, Mr. Serbyn and his wife (a French national) were back at the
Consulate with their documents. Mr. Serbyn"s wife presented her French
passport and Mr. Serbyn presented his identity card. Both Mr. and Mrs.
Serbyn were examined by a medical doctor. Shortly thereafter, the
Serbyns were informed that their visas would be issued. Mr. Serbyn does
not remember being asked any questions regarding his activities during
the Second World War. Mr. Serbyn became a Canadian citizen in 1957 or
[It is not clear whether Judge Nadon feels that Mr. Serbyn should be denaturalized and deported.]
 Mr. Katriuk also called as a
witness George Hiltschuk, another Ukrainian from Bukovina. Mr.
Hiltschuk was born on July 18, 1921. He met Mr. Katriuk during the
march to Kyiv in the fall of 1941. In 1942, Mr. Hiltschuk became a
member of Battalion 118. He was in platoon number 2 of company 1.
He also joined the FFI in August 1944. In November 1944, Mr. Hiltschuk
enrolled in the FFL for a period of three years. Shortly after joining
the FFL, he was sent to Oran, Algeria, for military training. He spent
one and one half years in Africa and was sent to Vietnam. He remained
in Vietnam for eighteen months and then returned to Paris. As he
already knew Mr. Katriuk and his wife, he contacted and stayed with
them. In 1950, Mr. Hiltschuk decided that he wanted to visit his
uncle who had been living in Toronto for over thirty years. On the
basis of a letter of invitation received from his uncle and evidence
that his travel costs were paid, Mr. Hiltschuk was given a visa for six
months. Mr. Hiltschuk testified that, in the course of obtaining
his visa, he was never asked about his activities between 1938 and
1945. He boarded a ship at Le Havre and landed in Halifax in December
1950. He stayed with his uncle for a few months and, at the end of
January 1951, commenced work in a factory on St-Clair Avenue in
Toronto, even though he did not have a work permit. At the end of his
six months in Canada, he informed his uncle that it was his desire to
remain in Canada. He went to an immigration office in Toronto with his
uncle and his uncle signed an application to sponsor him as a permanent
resident. In April 1953, Mr. Hiltschuk was landed as an immigrant to
this country. Five years later, he applied for Canadian citizenship and
was successful. At no time during this whole process does Mr. Hiltschuk
remember being asked anything about his activities during the Second
[It is not clear whether Judge Nadon feels that Mr. Hiltschuk should be denaturalized and deported.]
SUMMARY AND FINDINGS
[In the sections below, Judge Nadon uses
the term "in my view" twelve times. He thus concedes that alternate
interpretations of the evidence are possible. We suggest that the vast
majority of people familiar with the issues would disagree with his
 Order in council P.C. 1950/2856, enacted pursuant to paragraph 38(c) of the Immigration Act, 1927,
allowed the Government of Canada to prohibit or limit the landing in
Canada of certain categories of immigrants. By way of Direction No. 14,
Cabinet made it clear that collaborators and users of false or
fictitious names or documents were inadmissible under the Immigration Act, 1927 and should be refused a visa.
[In sections , , , 
and , Judge Nadon refers to Order-in-Council P.C.-2856, presumably
passed on June 9, 1950, to liberalize immigration rules and revoke
P.C.-2743. There is no reference to collaborators or false names in
these sections. In section , Judge Nadon states: "On Oct. 28, 1949,
cabinet issued Directive No. 14", which, presumably, does refer to
collaborators and false names. We fail to follow Judge Nadon's logic in
this regard. We would have thought that the 1950 Order-in-Council
P.C.-2856 (deliberately issued to liberalize immigration rules) would
have superceded the 1949 Directive No. 14, rather than reinforce it.
Although we are in no position to rule on the legalities of Cabinet
Directives, we submit that they do not carry the moral authority of
legal statutes passed by the Parliament of Canada.]
 The R.C.M.P., which had been
entrusted with the responsibility of screening prospective immigrants
on security grounds, was made aware of Cabinet"s decision to reject
certain categories of immigrants and, more particularly, had been told
that collaborators and users of false or fictitious names or documents
should be rejected. It is clear from the documents and from the
testimony of the former R.C.M.P. officers that the officers in the
field had been informed with respect to the rejection criteria and,
more particularly, regarding collaborators and users of false or
fictitious names or documents. Of that, in my view, there cannot be any
[We have noted above that the RCMP Act
did not grant the RCMP authority to conduct security screening abroad.
We have also noted that there is general consensus that the RCMP had
been infiltrated by Soviet intelligence. The infiltration of British
intelligence by Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt
and others has been well documented.
Judge Nadon has certainly expended a great deal of effort to justify
his views on the theoretical aspects of security screening. Theory is
not reality. Judge Nadon himself admits that there is no record of any
security screening taking place in Paris of Mr. Katriuk, or anyone
else. He has not produced any evidence in this regard whatsoever. In
fact, all testimony indicates otherwise.]
 I am satisfied that there was an
immigration process in place which, if followed, would, in all
likelihood, have led to the rejection of Mr. Katriuk. When I say that
there was an immigration process in place, I mean that the government,
through the Security Panel, had established criteria by which the
admissibility of applicants for permanent residence in Canada would be
decided and that the relevant criteria had been passed on to the agency
whose responsibility it was to apply the criteria to those who applied
for a visa. "Collaborators" and those who used false or fictitious
names were categories of immigrants who were not to be admitted into
this country by the R.C.M.P.. The former R.C.M.P. officers who
testified before me all agreed that non-Germans who had fought with the
German army or who had helped the German Forces against the allies
were, as far as they were concerned, collaborators and were to be
[Judge Nadon is presumably referring to
William H. Kelly, who was in London collaborating with British
intelligence from 1951 to 1954; Donald Graham Cobb, who was in Paris
from 1954 to 1958; and Donald D. Cliffe, who was in Italy from 1951 to
1954. They certainly had nothing to do with Mr. Katriuk in Paris in
1951. These are paid expert witnesses for Anne McLellan and her
minions, who would not be testifying if their testimony was not
satisfactory to the prosecution. Like all bureaucrats, they must
justify their existence. Does Judge Nadon expect them to testify that
they were slovenly and that their performance was not perfect?]
 One of the issues which I must
decide is whether Mr. Katriuk, when he applied for a visa to enter this
country in 1951, was asked to provide information concerning his
activities between 1938 and 1945, either by way of questions in the
form that he signed or by way of questions posed by the security
officer during an interview.
[There is no evidence whatsoever that Mr.
Katriuk was asked to provide such information by the employee of the
Canadian Consulate in Paris in 1951, who filled out the immigration
application form on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk. Furthermore, the
overwhelming evidence is that Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk were not interviewed
by an RCMP security officer.]
 There is not much evidence
concerning the Paris Consulate in 1951. The closest we get to the Paris
Consulate is by way of the information which appears in Major Wright"s
report to R.C.M.P. Headquarters in November 1950. In that report, Major
Wright relates his meetings and discussions with the security officer
in the Paris office, Sergeant Colville, and the immigration
officer-in-charge, Mr. Cormier. It appears from Major Wright"s report
that Sergeant Colville was overwhelmed with work and, as a result of
his discussions with Colville and Cormier, Major Wright made a strong
recommendation that a second security officer be posted to Paris "as
soon as possible". Major Wright makes it clear in his report that one
of the reasons a second officer is necessary in the Paris office is
that this "would enable personal interviews of all immigrants to be
made". As I indicated earlier, there is no evidence that a second
security officer was sent to Paris to assist Sergeant Colville. Was
Sergeant Colville in the Paris office when Mr. Katriuk applied in 1951?
If he was, was he the only security officer or had another officer been
posted to Paris? There is no evidence whatsoever in that regard.
[We repeat the words of Judge Nadon: No evidence whatsoever.]
 I know for a fact that the
immigration officer in charge of the Paris office, Mr. Cormier,
was still there in January 1951 since I have evidence of correspondence
between Mr. Cormier and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration
in Ottawa regarding the revised O.S.8 form. In his letter to Ottawa
dated January 8, 1951, Mr. Cormier indicates that the Paris
office, for stage "B" purposes, will attach to the revised O.S.8 form a
questionnaire which the applicant will have to fill out. The
questionnaire, which I reproduced earlier, requests the applicant to
provide his residences and employments since 1939. It also requests the
applicant, if not born in France, to indicate where and when he entered
[And as we indicated earlier, there is no evidence whatsoever, that Mr. Katriuk or anyone else filled out such a form.]
 The above is, for all intents and
purposes, the whole of the evidence concerning the Paris office in
1951. No one who was employed at the Paris Consulate in 1951, either as
a security officer or visa officer, was called by the Minister to
testify. Further, no one was called by the Minister to testify with
respect to the specific process in place in that office in 1951 and,
more particularly, the manner in which visa applications were
[Then why did Judge Nadon proceed with
the case? He could easily have excused himself. Was he afraid that he
would be denaturalized and deported had he done so?]
 The evidence has shown, for
example, that Mr. L.M. Carter was an employee in Canada"s Consular
Service in Paris in January 1949. The evidence has also shown that Mr.
A.J. Desjardins was the attaché, Visa Section, Paris, in August 1949. I
also have evidence that Sergeant Colville of the R.C.M.P. and a
Mr. Cormier were in the Paris office in November 1950. Through the
evidence of George Hiltschuk, it was also shown that, in December 1950,
one of the visa officers in the Paris office was a Mr. Mitchell.
According to Joseph Gunn, Mr. Mitchell, a high ranking officer in the
Visa Section in Paris, had been living in Canada when he died three or
four years ago. The Minister did not offer any explanation as to why
none of these potential witnesses were called. I know through the
evidence that Mr. Mitchell is dead. However, with respect to the other
potential witnesses, the evidence is silent.
[Repeat: The evidence is silent.]
 One would also have expected the
Minister to call as witnesses, persons who immigrated to Canada at
about the same time as Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk in order to show how visa
applications were being processed by the Paris office and to show that
the Paris office was asking prospective immigrants what they did
between 1938 and 1945. These witnesses could have also testified with
respect to the immigration process as implemented by the Paris
Consulate. For example, the C.G.R. form, to which I referred earlier in
these reasons, contains the names of every passenger who came to Canada
in August 1951 onboard the ship NELLY. Many of these passengers, as appears from sheet number 49 on which the names of Mr. and Mrs. Schpirka are found, boarded the NELLY
at Le Havre. All I have in evidence is one sheet of the C.G.R. form and
it is clear that there were at least 49 sheets and perhaps more,
each containing the names of at least 20 immigrants. Once again, the
Minister did not offer any explanation as to why no one was called to
testify with respect to the form being used and the questions being
asked at the Paris office in 1951.
[Repeat: Anne McLellan did not offer any explanation for her failure.]
 The end result is that the
Minister adduced no evidence, other than the documentary evidence to
which I have already referred, to demonstrate that Mr. Katriuk was
specifically asked about his war time activities. I am not concluding
that Mr. Katriuk was not asked about these activities, rather I am
concluding that the Minister has not met the burden imposed upon her to
establish that fact.
[Repeat: Anne McLellan has not met the burden of proof.]
 Before moving on to the events of
1957 and 1958 in Montreal, I must say a few words about the immigration
form in use in the Paris office in 1951. Form O.S.8 and revised form
O.S.8 were sent to the various consulate offices abroad, including the
Paris office. Revised form O.S.8 did not contain questions which dealt
specifically with an applicant"s war time activities. As appears from
Mr. Cormier"s memorandum of January 8, 1951, he informed his
superiors in Ottawa that the Paris office did not believe that the
revised O.S.8 form was sufficient for the purposes of stage "B".
That is why Mr. Cormier indicated that a questionnaire would be
attached to the form so as to obtain from the applicant information
regarding his residences and employments since 1939. Was there a
question in the form which Mr. and Mrs. Schpirka filled out when they
applied in 1951, which sought from them specific information regarding
their activities during the war years? On the evidence, I am not
prepared to make such a finding. However, I am prepared to find, and do
find, that Mr. Katriuk must, at the very least, have been asked to
answer the two questions which appear on either form O.S.8 or revised
form O.S.8., namely details regarding the longest job he had had in the
last ten years and the number of jobs he had had during those ten
years. I am also finding that Mr. Katriuk must have been asked when and
how he arrived in France. Mrs. Katriuk made it clear during her
cross-examination that a number of questions had been asked by an
employee of the Consulate. She conceded that she and her husband must
have signed an application. She specifically remembered answering a
number of questions which appear either on form O.S.8 or on revised
form O.S.8. In discussing the events which took place in Montreal, I
will be returning to the questions which I believe were asked of Mr.
Katriuk and which, in my view, were not truthfully answered.
[We are pleased that Judge Nadon appears
to concede that an employee of the Consulate (not an RCMP security
officer) filled out the forms on behalf of both Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk.
The employee's main concern was to satisfy the demands for immigrants
of Immigration Canada and he probably filled out over thirty such forms
a day. There is no way of ascertaining what form was filled out or what
questions were asked. However, let us play Judge Nadon's game and
propose answers to his proposed questions.
Mr. Katriuk's, or rather Mr. Schpirka's, longest job was obviously the
3 years running his business from 1948 to 1951. Previous to that he had
jobs as a butcher -- one for 2 years and one for 8 months. Previous to
that, he would have stuck with the cover story his compatriots in the
French partisans had prepared for him and which was reflected in his ID
papers. For all we know, he could have truthfully said that he was
forced to work (one year in Kyiv and one year in Belarus) and fight for
the Germans and defected to the French partisans when he found the
opportunity. But, of course, he would not have revealed that his real
name was Katriuk for fear of being courtmartialed and shot by the FFL.
If Mr. Katriuk had not had that unfortunate episode with the FFL and
been forced to change his name, his answers would have been virtually
the same and the outcome would have been the same. This is attested to
by the thousands of other refugees immigrating from Europe under
 The above findings do not,
however, allow me to answer the question posed by the Minister as to
whether Mr. Katriuk obtained his Canadian citizenship by false
representations or fraud or by knowingly concealing material
circumstances. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to
examine the events which took place in Montreal in 1957 when the
applicant applied to the Department of Immigration to correct the name
under which he was landed in Canada on August 14, 1951.
 The purpose of Mr. Katriuk's
application for correction of his visa application was not simply to
correct his name. The true purpose, in my view, was to allow the
landing of Vladimir Katriuk on August 14, 1951, in Quebec City, failing
which Mr. Katriuk could not apply and obtain, as he did, Canadian
citizenship in 1958. I have already related the relevant facts and made
reference to the relevant correspondence which led to the Department"s
decision to amend its records and to show that Vladimir Katriuk and his
wife Maria Stephanie Katriuk were granted landing at Quebec City on
August 14, 1951.
[Only a sick twisted mind would make the
suggestion that Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk would have some ulterior motives
in wanting to revert to their true names. They could very easily have
obtained their citizenship under the name of Schpirka and lived in
anonymity for the rest of their lives. Instead, out of self-respect for
their own identity and respect for their new country, Canada, they went
through the complicated procedure -- very sincerely and very openly --
of changing their names back to Katriuk. Since its inception Canada had
welcomed millions of the poor and the hungry to develop its vast area.
They were grateful to be given the opportunity to live in and help
Marc Nadon owes Vladimir and Maria (Kawun) Katriuk an apology. Marc Nadon owes Canadians an apology.]
 Mr. and Mrs. Schpirka were landed
in Quebec City on August 14, 1951. In applying for a visa to come to
Canada and in obtaining landing, they knowingly concealed material
circumstances in that they failed to divulge their true identities. As
a result, the officers in the Paris Consulate were, no doubt, deprived
of essential information that might have enabled them to determine
whether or not Mr. Katriuk should be admitted to Canada. That is why,
in my view, the question posed by the Minister cannot be answered
without considering together the events in Paris in 1951 and in
Montreal in 1957. In other words, in order to decide whether Mr.
Katriuk obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation, or
fraud, or by knowingly concealing material circumstances, Mr. Katriuk's
application in 1957 and the information provided by him to obtain the
correction of his name must be considered as part and parcel of his
1951 visa application. This, in my view, is the correct approach in law
since the respondent, Vladimir Katriuk, was granted landing in Quebec
City by reason of the decision taken in Montreal in 1957.
[The employee in the Paris Consulate who
filled out the immigration forms on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Schpirka was
obviously deprived of the knowledge that their true names were Katriuk.
Beyond that, there is no evidence whatsoever that the employee asked
any questions, which were not answered truthfully and which may have
influenced the employee in granting the application.]
 Mr. Katriuk's affidavit dated
October 18, 1957 is not in evidence. No explanation was given to me why
the affidavit was not available. All I know concerning that affidavit
is what appears in the memorandum of October 17, 1958 sent by the
Department of Immigration to the Registrar of Canadian Citizenship. It
appears from that memorandum that Mr. Katriuk declared that he was born
on October 10 [sic], 1921 at
Luzhany, Bukovina, Romania, that he took refuge in France in 1944 and
that he enlisted a few months later in the FFL under his true name. I
know for a fact that Mr. Katriuk did not say anything in his affidavit
concerning his activities prior to his arrival in France in 1944. I
know this because Mr. Katriuk testified that he had not provided this
information to his attorney Me Massé.
[Once again Anne McLellan and her minions have failed in their duty to provide the relevant information.
Judge Nadon does not know anything "for a fact" about what was in the
affidavit or what information Mr. Katriuk provided to Paul Masse. Judge
Nadon implies that the affidavit in question was written by Paul Masse.
Does Judge Nadon believe that Paul Masse was somehow "hoodwinked" by
Mr. Katriuk? Even if Paul Masse were familiar with every last intricate
detail of the life of Vladimir and Maria Katriuk, does Judge Nadon feel
that Paul Masse would have written a different affidavit?]
 Mr. Katriuk's statement that he
"took refuge in France in 1944" is not, on the evidence before me, an
accurate and truthful statement. Mr. Katriuk came to France, not as a
refugee, but as a member of a battalion which had been fighting with
Germany against one of the allied powers. It is true that at the end of
August or September 1944, Mr. Katriuk and many of his colleagues left
the German camp to join the French underground. However, in my view, it
cannot be said by any stretch of the imagination that Mr. Katriuk "took
refuge in France in 1944". That is simply not the case.
[We must respectfully disagree with Judge
Nadon. What better description is there than "took refuge in France in
1944" to describe the situation of Mr. Katriuk? He took refuge from the
Germans with the French partisans when he deserted the German army. He
fought with the French against the Germans until he was threatened by
the Russian KGB with repatriation to the Soviet Union. He then took
refuge with the French Foreign Legion and again fought with the Western
Allies against the Germans, was wounded, recovered and fought once
again. He was prepared to go to Vietnam. But when his commanding
officer in the FFL threatened him with death, he deserted and once
again took refuge with his comrades in the French partisans. He de facto
lived as a refugee in France until he managed to immigrate to Canada.
He stopped being a refugee when Judge Robitaille presented him with his
Canadian citizenship on November 10, 1958. Or so he thought. What more
could Judge Nadon possibly demand of a human being?]
 It must be pointed out that Mr.
Katriuk's application in 1957 is an application whereby he asks the
Department of Immigration to amend its records on the basis of new
information. The decision to allow the name change, and hence to land
him as of August 14, 1951, was made on the basis of that
information. This appears quite clearly from the letter dated May 13,
1958, sent by the Department to Me Massé to advise him that his
clients" application had been granted.
[But surely the Department made the
appropriate checks and came to the appropriate decision. It must be
emphasized that Mr. Katriuk followed the advice of his priest, his
lawyer and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in attaining
the name change and his citizenship.]
 The documents introduced into
evidence by the Minister show that, commencing June 1955, a number of
persons applied to the Department of Immigration to amend their landing
records so as to allow them to revert to their true names. In a
memorandum dated June 13, 1955 from the Chief, Admissions Division, to
the Director of the Department, the following information appears:
1. The following are suggested instructions to the field:
There has come to light
during applications for citizenship, a number of cases of persons
having come to Canada under names other than their rightful ones and
now wish to assume their proper names. If any of these persons come to
the attention of the field officers, examination under Section 1919 is not to be invoked unless it is definitely established that the change of name was for the purpose of gaining illegal entry.
The procedure to be
followed is to secure the full particulars and the reasons for coming
forward under assumed names. Such cases should be referred to Branch
Headquarters so that consideration may be given to their request and to
the amending of our records. |
Cases such as
above where the persons are simply reverting to their correct name,
should not be confused with the change of name which requires court
action and the aid of a lawyer.
[Who was the Chief, Admissions Division?
Was this the same person who wrote the Oct. 17, 1958 memo referred to
in sections  and ? How was this decision arrived at? Were
there parliamentary or cabinet discussions and directives on the
matter? Are records available? Was this memorandum specifically made
for the benefit of the large number of Jewish immigrants who had
illegally arrived after the war? It would be most interesting to
examine the full list and circumstances of the beneficiaries of this
 In June 1955, the Chief,
Administration Division, sent a similar memorandum to the Chiefs of
Divisions and Heads of Sections. In July 1955, a similar memorandum was
sent to the District Superintendents. As appears from the memorandum of
June 13, 1955, field officers were not to invoke Section 19 of the Immigration Act, 1927
unless they could "definitely" establish that the applicant had changed
his name "for the purpose of gaining illegal entry". I must therefore
conclude that Mr. Katriuk's application was granted because there was
no evidence that he had changed his name for an improper or illegal
[Once again, who was the Chief, Administration Division, etc.?
In the section below, we intersperse our comments throughout the text
to try to respond to the incredible gymnastics of Judge Nadon's
reasoning. Our apologies.]
 Why did Mr. Katriuk state in his application that he had taken refuge in France in 1944? [Because it was the truth.]
There is no evidence that he was asked any questions in respect of his
1957 application. Mr. Katriuk is the one who approached the Department
of Immigration for the purpose of correcting his visa application file.
In my view, he provided that information because he believed it was
necessary for him to explain how he had arrived in France in 1944. [As stated earlier, Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk could easily have retained the name Schpirka the rest of their lives.]
In my view, he was of that belief because, in all likelihood, that question had been asked of him in France in 1951. [Mr. Katriuk was certainly not "of that belief".]
The questionnaire proposed to be attached to the revised O.S.8 form by
Mr. Cormier contains a question which requires an applicant, not born
in France, to state when and where he entered France. [There is no evidence whatsoever, that such a questionnaire was ever utilized.]
That question appears below the question concerning his residences and
employments since 1939. Although I am unable to find that the question
relating to Mr. Katriuk's activities since 1939 did appear in the form
which Mr. Katriuk signed or that that question was asked to Mr.
Katriuk, I am prepared to find, and I do so find, that Mr. Katriuk must
have been asked in France to indicate when and where he entered France.
[This is pure speculation by Judge Nadon.
We submit that even if the question had been asked, Mr. Katriuk could
have replied truthfully (except for the name change) and the employee
who filled out the forms for Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk would still have
approved their application.]
That is why, in my view, he provided that information in his affidavit of October 1957. [That is simply not true.]
In any event, even if Mr. Katriuk was not asked such a question in
1951, that information was furnished to the Department of Immigration
with a view of convincing the authorities that he had not entered
Canada under a false name for an improper or illegal purpose. [It
is abhorrent of Judge Nadon to suggest that Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk
entered Canada for an improper or illegal purpose. They simply wanted
to live in Canada and become good citizens.]
information was, in my view, relevant and material to the decision
which the Department took. If Mr. Katriuk had not concealed that he had
arrived in France in August 1944 as a member of the merged battalion
and his subsequent defection to the French underground, the likelihood
is that the Department, in view of the applicable rejection criteria
prescribed by the Government, would have, at the very least,
investigated Mr. Katriuk through the available channels. [This
is all speculation. There is no evidence that Mr. Katriuk deliberately
concealed anything material from his lawyer or in the affidavit
prepared by his lawyer.]
As a result of this investigation, the
Department would have then been in a position to decide whether Mr.
Katriuk fell under an excluded category of immigrants. Whether or not
the decision would have been favourable to Mr. Katriuk is not, in my
view, relevant. [Judge Nadon's views are incredible!]
In saying this, I am prepared to recognize that there was a possibility
that an immigration officer could have decided to admit Mr. Katriuk to
Canada. The evidence has shown that the Security Officers were vested
with some discretion in making their decisions regarding the admission
of collaborators. A number of documents support this point of view. In
his February 9, 1949 memorandum to the Commissioner, the Associate
Commissioner of Immigration, Overseas Service, states that "[a]ccording
to instructions, if the proposed immigrant has been forced to serve the
enemy forces and could obtain evidence to that effect he was then
admissible". To the same effect is the memorandum sent by the Secretary
of the Security Panel to the Panel dated April 30, 1952, where the
Secretary states, at paragraph 10, that: "[p]resent immigration
security policy prohibits the immigration of collaborators, but cases
have so far been dealt with on their individual merits or demerits".
[In our view, no matter what the
circumstances proposed by Judge Nadon, the ruling of the immigration
authorities would have been favorable to Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk.]
 The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Minister of Manpower and Immigration
 S.C.R. 850, stands, in my view, for the proposition that, even
if the department"s investigation had not led to the rejection of Mr.
Katriuk, the circumstances concealed by Mr. Katriuk are nonetheless
[... legal material re Brooks in , , ,  deleted ...]
 I am also of the view that the
questions relating to an applicant"s jobs during the ten years prior to
his application were such as to require an applicant to disclose, if
that be the case, that he had been a participant in the Second World
War. On the evidence before me, I can only find that Mr. Katriuk did
not truthfully answer those questions. I should point out that I did
not find Mr. Katriuk's evidence concerning his application for a visa
in Paris in 1951 very credible. Mr. Katriuk's evidence was simply that
the visa officer did not ask him anything. I do not find his version of
these events plausible.
[As stated above, there is no evidence
whatsoever that the employee who filled out Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk's
immigration form asked these questions. Participation in the Second
World War was not a "job". Testimony by ex-immigrants at the Deschenes
Commission to the effect that they were not asked about their wartime
activities was found by the Commission to be credible. The least Judge
Nadon could do would be to interview the thousands of people who passed
through the Paris immigration turnstiles during the 1950s to ascertain
a more realistic "version of these events".]
 For these reasons, I must
conclude that Mr. Katriuk was not lawfully admitted to Canada for
permanent residence. Consequently, Mr. Katriuk is deemed to have
obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation, or fraud or
by concealing material circumstances contrary to the Citizenship Act.
[On page 224 of the Deschenes Commission
Report, finding #43 states: "The existence of a presumption of fact
that a former immigrant, if a war criminal, must have lied for purposes
either of immigration or of citizenship, cannot be taken generally for
granted, in light of the conflicting evidence before the Commission. It
must be left to the courts to decide whether, in any given case, such a
presumption has been established with a high degree of probability."
Despite the Verdict of Judge Nadon, any fair-minded person must
conclude that Judge Nadon and Anne McLellan failed miserably in
satisfying this criterion.
We also note that Judge Nadon uses almost the exact terminology of Mr.
Amerasinghe (now chief prosecutor of the Canadian War Crimes Unit) in
his 1983 proposals to utilize denaturalization and deportation as was
being used by the Office of Special Investigations in the United
States. (ibid. pp. 215-216)]
 A few final points. During the
hearing, I ruled that the evidence of Michael Jankowsky taken by way of
Commission Evidence in Poland in April 1998 was inadmissible. In making
the ruling, I orally gave my reasons. If the parties wish to obtain
more detailed reasons, they shall so advise me.
[Who was Michael Jankowsky?]
 I also heard an application by
Mr. Katriuk to stay these proceedings on a number of grounds. That
application is denied. Separate reasons will be given within fifteen
 At the end of the hearing, counsel [Orest Rudzik]
for Mr. Katriuk asked me not to dispose of the costs issue before he
could address the issue. I will therefore not make a ruling on this and
will leave it to the parties to speak to me on that issue as soon as it
Ottawa, Ontario "MARC NADON"
January 29, 1999 JUDGE
1 Paragraph 10(1)(b) is also, in my view, relevant.
2 Page 78 of the transcript of Mr. Khrenov"s cross-examination of March 30, 1998.
3 By "Schuma", Professor Golczewski means "militia".
strenuously object to the creation and use of a term suitable only for
grade B Hollywood movies by Golczewski, Messerschmidt and even Judge
Nadon, himself. The proper terminology in German is Schutzmannschaft
(singular) or Schutzmannschaften (plural). In the text above, we have
changed to the appropriate English term Militia.]
4. The Soviet occupation with its reprisals and
executions, lasted until such time as Germany invaded the newly created
regions of the Soviet Union in June of 1941 and shortly thereafter
arrived in Bukovina together with its allied forces of Hungarians and
5. Mr. Katriuk, as did many of his contemporaries and
compatriots, anticipated the possibility of having Ukraine as an
independent state, because of the rapid collapse of Soviet authority in
6. Mr. Katriuk therefore joined a
volunteer force which was intended to provide law and order in the
territories being fled by the Soviet forces (who exacted fearful
repressions and executions as they retreated), and eventually to
provide the basis of a Ukrainian force which would allow Ukraine to
maintain sovereignty as independent of both the Soviet Union and Nazi
7. Mr. Katriuk, with his colleagues, for
this reason set out for the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, on a three month
trek, which was interrupted as to entry in Kyiv because of Kyiv having
been mined by the retreating Soviet forces so that Mr. Katriuk and his
colleagues arrived in Kyiv only as of November of December of 1941.
8. Once arrived in Kyiv and being
stationed in some barracks that had previously been occupied by Soviet
internal security, the command of his group unfurled a Ukrainian flag
with the national symbol of a trident, which had been savagely
repressed and prohibited by the Soviet authorities.
Once arrived in Kyiv and being stationed in
some barracks that had previously been occupied by Soviet internal
security, the command of his group unfurled a Ukrainian flag with the
national symbol of a trident, which had been savagely repressed and
prohibited by the Soviet authorities.
9. The Germans acted in exactly similar
fashion as the Soviet by confiscating all such would be national
symbols, arresting the command of any such Ukrainian unit, and
executing the chief officers in order to make clear that no such
national manifestations would be tolerated.
Instead the Germans proceeded to create a force
to assist them in maintaining law and order and to have guard duties,
numbering such force the 115th Battalion. Service in such
Battalion was indicated to Mr. Katriuk and his colleagues as the only
alternative to deportation as slave labour to the Nazi Reich.
7 Pages 69 and 70 of the transcript of Mr. Khrenov"s cross-examination of March 30, 1998
8 For a complete and detailed review of Canada"s immigration policy, see the judgment of Noël J. in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
(21 December 1998), Ottawa: F.C.T.D., T-938-95 [unreported], at pages
67 to 73. At pages 73 to 87, Noël J. reviews in detail Canada"s policy
regarding the security screening of immigrants. See also pages 17 to 21
(paragraphs 61 to 77) of McKeown J."s decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
v. Bogutin, (1998), 144 F.T.R. 1.
9 See P.C. 695, 21 March 1931. The relevant portion of the Order in Council reads as follows:
The Immigration Officer-in-Charge may permit to land in Canada any
immigrant who otherwise complies with the provisions of the Immigration
Act, if it shown to his satisfaction that such immigrant is: -
A British subject entering Canada directly or indirectly from
Great Britain or Northern Ireland, the Irish Free Sate, Newfoundland,
the United States of America, New Zealand, Australia, or the Union of
South Africa, who has sufficient means to maintain himself until
employment is secured: Provided that the only persons admissible under
the authority of this clause are British subjects by reason of birth or
naturalization in Canada, Great Britain or Northern Ireland, the Irish
Free Sate, Newfoundland, New Zealand, Australia, or the Union of South
A United States citizen entering Canada from the United States who
has sufficient means to maintain himself until employment is secured.
The wife or unmarried child under 18 years of age of any person
legally admitted to and resident in Canada who is in a position to
receive and care for his dependents.
The father or mother, the unmarried son or daughter eighteen years of age for [sic]
over, the unmarried brother of sister, the orphan nephew or niece under
sixteen years of age, of any person legally admitted to and resident in
Canada, who is in a position to receive and care for such relatives.
The term "orphan" used in this clause means a child bereaved of both
An agriculturist having sufficient means to farm in Canada.
The fiancee of any adult male legally admitted to and resident in
Canada who is in a position to receive, marry and care for his intended
A person who, having entered Canada as a non-immigrant, enlisted
in the Canadian Armed Forces and, having served in such Forces, has
been honourably discharged therefrom.
10 P.C. 6687, October 26, 1945
11 At page 915 of volume II (2nd
ed.) of the Canadian Encyclopedia, the following entry appears under the name of Gouzeko, Igor Sergeievich:
Gouzenko, Igor Sergeievich, intelligence officer, author (b
at Rogachov, USSR 13 Jan 1919; d near Toronto late June 1982). At the
beginning of WWII Gouzenko took intelligence training and in 1943 was
appointed cipher clerk at the Soviet legation in Ottawa, where he
learned that Soviet intelligence operated several spy networks in
Canada. Disenchanted with Soviet life and politics, he decided to
defect when he learned in 1945 that he and his family were to be sent
home. On Sept 5 Gouzenko left the embassy with documents illustrating
Soviet espionage activities. Initially, no one in Ottawa took him
seriously; only on Sept 7, following an abortive Soviet attempt to
recapture him, were he and his family given protective custody. When it
became evident that a widespread espionage network was operating,
Mackenzie King"s government authorized the arrest of 12 suspects. After
interrogation, they were brought before a royal commission. Gouzenko"s
testimony and documents impressed the commissioners, who confirmed in
July 1946 that a spy ring had been operating in Canada, aimed at, among
other things, the secrets of the atomic bomb. A number of suspects were
subsequently convicted and
was given a new identity, and for the rest of his life he and his
family had police protection. He produced a memoir, This Was My Choice (1948), and a novel, The Fall of a Titan,
which received the Gov Gen"s Award (1954). From time to time he emerged
from the shadows, always wearing a protective mask, which for most
Canadians became his trademark. Even his death apparently from natural
causes, was surrounded in secrecy.
12 At that time, Colonel L. Fortier was the associate Commissioner, Overseas Service, Immigration Branch.
13 Expert witness Nicholas D"Ombrain, called by the Minister, explained in his affidavit dated July 31, 1997, Cabinet Directives
22. As has been seen, Cabinet documents
were treated with very great secrecy, as is still largely the case
today. As has also been noted, the role of the Cabinet, although vital
to the smooth functioning of government, is essentially informal. The
early years of the Cabinet Secretariat were necessarily experimental.
One such experiment was the creation of a new class of documents, known
as "Cabinet Directives". These were administrative instructions of
general application, whose utility lay in their widespread distribution
throughout the Public Service. They dealt with subjects such as
instructions on the drafting of legislation, security clearance
standards and procedures for government employees, the granting of
special holiday leaves for occasions such as royal visits, and rules
for flying the Canadian flag.
23. Cabinet Directives are not to be
confused with Records of Cabinet Decision, Cabinet Conclusions or
Decision Letters. They are essentially public documents, widely
available and not, for example, covered by the exceptions set out in
Section 69 of the Access to Information Act dealing with
Cabinet confidences. In the 57 years since the creation of the Cabinet
Secretariat, there have been fewer than 50 Cabinet Directives. This
contrasts with the production of approximately 300 memoranda to Cabinet
in a typical year.
24. It should be noted that the term
Cabinet Directive is frequently used in a rather loose and imprecise
way to refer to Cabinet Decisions. I have noted this in some of the
documents that I have reviewed for this affidavit.
is no evidence as to whether Major Wright"s recommendation that an
additional security officer be posted in Paris was ever followed up.
15 "Stage B", as we will see later, was the process by which the security officer screened a perspective immigrant.
16 Laval Fortier was the Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration.
appears in the minutes of a meeting of the Security Panel dated
May 21, 1952 relating the discussions which took place on May 15,
Attached as an exhibit to form part of the C.G.R. form is a typewritten
documentn reproducing the manual entries which appear in the C.G.R.
form. At the end of Column 7 of Line 22, the maker of the typewritten
entries has indicated that Nicholas Schpirka was born in Mamaieski,
Ukraina. However, I read the manual entry as possibly indicating the
place of birth as being Mamaiesti. There appears to have been a village
of the name Mamaiesti Vechi situated thirteen kilometres west north
west of Chernovtsy. This village is apparently now named Altmamayeshti.
The village of Luzhany, where Mr. Katriuk was born, appears to also be
situated thirteen kilometres west north west of Chernovtsy. (See Where Once we Walked: A Guide to the Jewish Communities Destroyed in the Holocaust.
By Gary Mokotoff ]Avotayu, Inc. 1991]).
[We are disturbed by this footnote
because it may indicate that Judge Nadon was unduly influenced by the
Holocaust Industry in arriving at his verdict in this case. Was this
book submitted as evidence by the prosecution during the trial
proceedings? Or was it given to him after the trial, when he was
deliberating upon and writing his verdict?]
19 Immigration Act, R.S. 1952, c. 325 (the "Immigration Act, 1952"). Section 19(1)(e
)(viii) reads as follows:
19. (1) Where he has knowledge thereof, the clerk or
secretary of a municipality in Canada in which a person hereinafter
described resides or may be, an immigration officer or a constable or
other peace officer shall send a written report to the Director, with
full particulars concerning ...(e) any
person, other than a Canadian citizen or a person with Canadian
domicile, who ...(viii) came into Canada or
remains therein with a false or improperly issued passport, visa,
medical certificate or other document pertaining to his admission or by
reason of any false or misleading information, force, stealth or other
fraudulent or improper means, whether exercised or given by himself or
by any other person,